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Civil RICO, Foreign Defendants, and "ET"
Michael Goldsmith**
and Vicki Rinne***
* This article is dedicated to the late Irving Younger.
A year after his death, it is still difficult for me to write about Irving
Younger. Although I co-authored an evidence text with Irving, I really did not
know him well. He was an intensely personal man, and so his battle with
cancer was very much a private affair.
Reflecting on Irving Younger, I realize that I knew him principally as
others did-as a whirlwind of energy captivating every lecture hall in which
he appeared. Part stand-up comic, part sage, Irving was loved by students
because he both kept them laughing and provided a beacon of clarity in an
environment that too often fostered tension and ambiguity. Practitioners
admired Irving for his skill in marshalling anecdotes and history to create
marvelous lectures that set new standards of excellence for continuing legal
education. Finally, faculty colleagues, although occasionally uncomfortable
with Irving's popularity, viewed him as a scholar capable of making important
contributions to our jurisprudence. These qualities allowed Irving Younger to
dominate our legal landscape for more than a decade. We benefited richly as a
result.
Irving's success did not deprive him of his humanity. As a newcomer to
teaching, I initially approached him with caution. I assumed that his stature
and busy schedule would make his time too scarce to be spent with me. I was
wrong. Through the years, Irving never failed to return a phone call, never
failed to provide assistance when requested, and never failed to provide
encouragement. Perhaps through these qualities, Irving best taught others
how to live.
I am honored that the Minnesota Law Review has asked me to contribute
to this issue commemorating Irving Younger. I hope that this article would
have appealed to him. As a former federal prosecutor, Irving was intrigued by
the character of organized crime in our society. As a practitioner, he loved the
challenge of complex litigation. As an instructor of civil procedure, Irving
thrived on the jurisdictional nuances that underlie our legal process. And, as a
legal scholar, Irving must have been fascinated by the application of a
racketeering statute to white-collar crime.
As I began to write the piece, I paused to consider that my topic was
geared too much to litigating lawyers--that it was too practical and not
sufficiently "academic." On further thought, however, I remembered that the
practicing bar was Irving Younger's principal audience and that his true skill
lay in converting academic complexities into practical realities. On this basis, I
hope this article does justice to Irving Younger's memory.
** Professor of Law, Brigham Young University.
*** Member of the Utah Bar, currently in private practice. The authors
wish to express their appreciation to Professor Lynn Wardle and to BYU law
librarian Gary Hill for their invaluable assistance on this project.
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"Acts done outside a jurisdiction, but intended to produce and
producing detrimental effects within it, justify a State in punishing
the cause of the harm as if [a defendant] had been present at the ef-
fect, if the State should succeed in getting him within its power."1
"Mhe extraterritorial application of the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organization Act ('RICO') may far exceed the securities
and antitrust laws both in terms of the scope of its reach and the hos-
tility of the reaction of the international community."2
The controversial Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or-
ganization law ("RICO") 3 soon may have extraterritorial effect.
Increasingly, civil RICO suits have been filed against foreign
defendants. Because no extraterritorial RICO case has yet re-
sulted in judgment,4 no international reaction has emerged.
United States litigation involving foreign parties, however, tra-
ditionally has encountered domestic procedural barriers5 and
foreign resistance.6 RICO, given its problematic past,7 likely
1. Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285 (1911) (Holmes, J.).
2. Fricano, RICO Extraterritoriality: Just a Matter of Time?, INT'L Bus.
LAW. May 1985, at 201, 201.
3. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 941 (1970) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
4. See infra note 59.
5. See I J. ATWOOD & M. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AiERICAN Busi-
NFSs ABROAD § 5.02 (1958) ("To say that [a United States law] will apply to
foreign corporations does not assure its application, for the court must be satis-
fied that the foreign defendant has sufficient ties with the United States to
justify bringing it into an American forum."). Procedural barriers include es-
tablishing jurisdiction over the conduct, see infra notes 74-93 and accompany-
ing text; over the parties, see infra notes 94-154 and accompanying text; and
enforcing court orders and judgments, see infra notes 155-81 and accompany-
ing text.
6. For example, in 1980 the Australian government urged all Common-
wealth countries to resist the extension of United States antitrust law abroad
and to react with retaliatory legislation. [Jan.-June] Antitrust & Trade Reg.
Rap. (BNA) No. 963, at A-li (May 8, 1980); see also infra notes 62-65 and ac-
companying text (noting grounds for hostility to RICO); see generally 1 W. Fu.
GATE, FOREIGN COMMRCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS § 2.16 (3d ed. 1982)
(noting foreign protest to U.S. assertion of extraterritorial jurisdisction and re-
sulting passage of blocking statutes).
7. Controversy has centered on the application of RICO to white-collar
crime and "legitimate businesses." See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S.
479, 506 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that Court's reading of civil
RICO provision as applying to legitimate businesses has caused "dislocations"
of congressional purpose); id. at 523-24 (Powell, J., dissenting) ("I write sepa-
rately to emphasize my disagreement with the Court's conclusion that the stat-
ute must be applied to authorize the types of private civil actions now being
brought frequently against respected businesses .... "); Blakey, The RICO
Civil Fraud Action in Context' Reflection on Bennett v. Berg, 58 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 237, 264 n.78, 268-79 (1983) (noting opposition to RICO's application to
legitimate organizations); see also infra notes 62-65 and accompanying text
(noting examples of criticism directed at RICO).
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will be no exception.
United States laws frequently have been applied to foreign
conduct. For example, in 1951 several companies began creat-
ing a cartel to control the watch export market." The cartel vi-
olated United States antitrust laws and a United States District
Court accordingly entered a consent decree barring the cartel's
conduct.9 This application of antitrust law was unusual, how-
ever, in that the cartel consisted of foreign companies and was
formed abroad with the encouragement and support of a for-
eign government.10 The case demonstrates that foreign persons
and transactions do not automatically escape regulation by
United States law."'
Extraterritoriality ("ET")'2 concerns the application of do-
mestic law to foreign conduct.' 3 The doctrine, which dates back
8. United States v. Watchmakers of Switz. Information Center, Inc., 1963
Trade Cas. (CCH) 70,600 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), order modified, 1965 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 71,352 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
9. Id.
10. Id
11. See Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d
909, 923 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("Certainly the doctrine of territorial sovereignty is
not such an artificial limit on the vindication of legitimate sovereign interests
that the injured state confronts the wrong side of a one-way glass, powerless to
counteract harmful effects originating outside its boundaries which easily
pierce its 'sovereign' walls, while its own regulatory efforts are reflected back
in its face.").
12. The Canadian Ambassador to the United States, Allan E. Gotlieb, re-
fers to the motion picture E.T.: The Extraterrestrial (Universal Studios 1982)
as perhaps "the most glamorous treatment of extraterritoriality . . . [it is]
about the dilemmas an unusual creature faces when he finds himself trapped
in a foreign jurisdiction." Gotlieb, Extraterritoriality: A Canadian Perspec-
tive, 5 Nw. J. INT L. & Bus. 449, 449 (1983).
13. Gotheb, supra note 12, at 449; see also Statement of the British-North
American Committee to Accompany the Repor4 quoted in A. HERMANN, CON.
FLICTS OF NATIONAL LAWS WITH INTERNATIONAL BusINEss ACTIVITY: ISSUES
OF EXTRATERRITORLALITY (1982) (stating that extraterritoriality concerns "the
application of one country's domestic legislation and/or judicial decisions to
acts or omissions within the territory of another"). But cf. Baxter, Standards
for the Application of United States Antitrust Law in an International Envi-
ronment, 1982 B.Y.U. L. REV. 841, 843 ("The problem.. . seems much more
closely akin to . . . the choice of law rules under the conflict of laws doc-
trine."); Griffin, A Primer on Extraterritoriality: 'ET' Isn't Going Home, INT'L
Bus. LAW., Jan. 1985, at 23, 23 ("[IThe proper question [is] not ET per se, but
rather when a nation may legitimately apply its domestic law to entities and
events outside its territory when that nation and another have valid jurisdic-
tional claims."); Robinson, Conflicts of Jurisdiction and the Draft Restate-
ment, 15 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1147, 1147 (1983) (stating that the term
extraterritoriality "is not conducive to dispassionate analysis. The phrase 'con-
flicts of jurisdiction,' . . . is preferable"); Smith, Extraterritorial Application of
U.S. Laws Outlined by Smith, 186 N.Y.L.J. 3, col.1 (1981) ("The true character
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to ancient times,1 4 has grown in importance and become more
controversial' 5 with the rapid rise of international trade and in-
vestment 16 and the appearance of multinational enterprises.17
The recent application of United States business laws to the
international commercial community has encountered pro-
nounced hostility.'8 International reaction to the extraterrito-
of the problem... is one of conflict over which nation's law and policy is to
apply and prevail"). Note that limiting extraterritoriality to choice of law
rules, however, ignores another dimension. In addition to determining which
nation's laws apply, extraterritoriality also involves a jurisdictional dimen-
sion-whether United States courts can exercise jurisdiction over foreign
defendants.
14. In Roman and medieval times, citizens were subject to their sover-
eign's jurisdiction wherever they traveled. Later, consuls of some powerful
states exercised criminal and civil jurisdiction over their nationals in foreign
countries. During much of the nineteenth century, the United States wielded
extraterritorial jurisdiction in China and the Ottoman Empire. See Dam, Ex-
tra-territoriality and Conflicts of Jurisdiction, in EXTRA-TERMTORIAL APPLI-
CATION OF LAWS AND RESPONSES THERETO 24-25 (C. Olmstead ed. 1984). In
this century, the Permanent Court of International Justice recognized the doc-
trine of extraterritoriality in the Lotus case. See The S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.),
1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, Sept. 7. Lotus concerned a high seas collision be-
tween French and Turkish ships that resulted in the death of a Turkish crew
member. I& at 32. When the French ship docked in Constantinople, the
French master was arrested, charged, and convicted of manslaughter. Id. at
26. France protested Turkey's jurisdiction to proceed and the case was sent to
the Permanent Court of International Justice. Id. at 27. The court held that
international law did not interfere with Turkey's right to bring a criminal
prosecution in these circumstances. Id. at 32. Thus, in some circumstances, a
nation may exercise jurisdiction over acts committed by foreigners outside its
territorial boundaries. Id. at 31.
15. See A. HERMANN, supra note 13, at 1 ("[C]onflicts of jurisdiction have
been increasing in frequency and importance in the last twenty years."); Dam,
Economic and Political Aspects of Extraterritoriality, 19 INT'L LAW. 887, 888
(1985) ("Extraterritoriality has become a bigger issue as the world economy
has grown more integrated."); Comment, Extraterritoriality: Current Policy
of the United States, 12 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & CoM. 493, 493 (1986) ("Interna-
tional businessmen and their counsel have increasingly been confronted by...
extraterritoriality.").
16. For example, at the end of 1987, United States direct investment
abroad totaled $308.8 billion. At the same time, foreign investment in the
United States equaled $261.9 billion. 68 U.S. DEP'T OF COM., SURVEY OF CUR-
RENT BUSINESS 42, 69 (1988).
17. Multinational corporations center operations in several countries, in
contrast to international corporations, which also do business globally but are
based in one country. BLAci's LAW DICTIONARY 916 (5th ed. 1979); see also
Baxter, supra note 13, at 841 (stating multinational character of many corpora-
tions leads several countries to assert that their laws should apply to such cor-
porations' conduct).
18. See Grundman, The New Imperialism: The Extraterritorial Applica-
tion of United States Law, 14 INT'L LAW. 257, 257 (1980) ("In the past twenty-
five years the United States has had three major exports: rock music, blue
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rial enforcement of United States law has resulted in
withdrawal of foreign investment, 19 blocking of corporate ac-
quisitions and mergers,20 and damage to foreign relations.2'
jeans, and United States law. The first two have acquired an acceptance the
last can never achieve. People resent being told what to do.").
Extraterritorial conflicts are particularly serious between the United
States and its democratic allies, because United States law recognizes defenses
less likely to arise in democratic nations. Defenses such as foreign compulsion,
act of state, and sovereign immunity potentially shield private defendants
from litigation by excusing acts intertwined with government rule. See infra
note 35. Thus, defendants from countries with strong government control over
business and industry escape suit. By comparison, citizens of more democratic
nations, which encourage the private control of business, may not enjoy the
same protection. See Grosfield & Rogers, A Shared Values Approach to Juris-
dictional Conflicts in International Economic Law, 32 INT'L & Comp. L.Q. 931,
933-34 (1983) (stating that citizens of a liberal (democratic) state have fewer
defenses to a United States lawsuit than those of states in which government
control is paramount). Former Secretary of State George Shultz has voiced
concern that extraterritorial conflicts may jeopardize the unity of the demo-
cratic nations and consequently threaten United States security, freedom, and
property. COMMENT, supra note 15, at 494 (citing 84 DEP'T ST. BULL. 36-37
(1984)).
19. In 1982, the United States imposed export controls to prevent foreign
businesses, as United States licensees, from selling equipment to the Soviet
Union for construction of a natural gas pipeline. Italy expressed opposition to
the sanction and threatened to suspend its agreement to buy 30 McDonnell
Douglas Corporation DC-9 jets. See Zaucha, The Soviet Pipeline Sanctions:
The Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Export Controls, 15 LAw & PoL'Y
INT'L Bus. 1169, 1176 (1983). Estimates place United States losses due to the
Soviet pipeline sanctions at $800 million in direct sales. Id. at 1177 (citing Muf-
son, Anatomy of Continuing Soviet Pipeline Controversy, Wall St. J., Aug. 31,
1982, at 29, col.1). In addition, former Secretary of State George Shultz has
noted that "[f]oreign aircraft manufacturers, for example, are already avoiding
U.S. made-high-technology navigational devices for fear that some day new
U.S. export controls might be imposed, preventing sales or drying up supplies
or parts." Comment, supra note 15, at 511 (citing 84 DEP'T ST. BULL. 33, 34
(1984)). Because of the uncertainty created by applying United States laws to
foreign business, at least one Asian telecommunications company has decided
against using United States technology. See Dam, supra note 15, at 890 n.17.
20. For example, the British Monopolies and Mergers Commission
blocked a proposed merger between a British firm and a United States corpo-
ration. The Commission feared that the merger would subject the British firm
to United States export controls and thereby hurt its export potential. Dam,
supra note 15, at 890 n.16. In addition, a number of United States businesses
have expressed concern that, as a result of extraterritorial export controls, for-
eign businesses would be reluctant to establish joint ventures and cooperative
agreements with United States companies. See Zaucha, supra note 19, at 1178
(citing Reauthorization of the Export Administration Act Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on International Finance and Monetary Policy of the Senate
Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 215-373,
472-713 (1983)).
21. Joel Davidow, former Director of Policy Planning, Antitrust Division,
United States Department of Justice, estimates that "there have been five dip-
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Despite such adverse consequences, the United States con-
tinues to apply its laws extraterritorially in an effort to protect
the policies underlying those laws. For example, absent extra-
territorial application of the antitrust laws, United States pro-
ducers and consumers could be victimized by foreign
anticompetitive activity.22 Multinational corporations regularly
market their products across national boundaries.23 If United
States laws stopped at the "water's edge,"24 a multinational cor-
poration's global reach would allow it to evade government reg-
ulations,25 damaging the United States's ability to protect its
lomatic protests of U.S. antitrust cases for every instance of express diplomatic
support, and three [statutes blocking the enforcement of U.S. court orders] for
every cooperation agreement." Davidow, Extraterritorial Antitrust and the
Concept of Comity, 15 J. WORLD TRADE L. 500, 502 (1981). In re Uranium An-
titrust Litigation, 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980), illustrates the negative impact
of extraterritoriality on foreign relations. When the foreign defendants re-
fused to appear at trial, default judgments were entered against them. IL at
1250. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the default while dismissing arguments
made by foreign governments on behalf of the defendants. Id. at 1256, 1259.
The court stated, "shockingly to us, the governments of the defaulters have
subserviently presented for them their case against the exercise of jurisdic-
tion." Id- at 1256. As a result, Robert Owen, the Legal Advisor of the United
States Department of State, wrote to then-Associate Attorney General John
Shenefield declaring that the opinion had caused "serious embarrassment to
the United States in its relations with some of our closest allies." Shenefield,
Extraterritorialityj in Antitst, 15 LAW & POL'Y BUs. 1109, 1117 (1983).
22. Senator George voiced this concern as follows:
Then if these conspirators are foreigners and remain at home ... and
there make the combination or agreement they escape the criminal
part of this law; and proceedings carrying out the combination may be
carried on with impunity in the United States. The raising of prices
and the prevention of free and full competition may all take place in
the United States, and yet no crime has been committed.
21 CONG. REC. 1766 (1890), cited in 1 J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, supra note 5,
at § 2.03.
23. See Gotlieb, supra note 12, at 451. Former Secretary of State George
Shultz has commented that the multinational corporation affects every type of
trade and industry. See 84 DEP'T. ST. BULL. 33 (1984), cited in Comment,
supra note 15, at 496.
24. Davis R. Robinson, Legal Advisor to the United States Department of
State, has written:
It is apparent that commercial decision-making and transactions are
not neatly contained within territorial boundaries in our interdepen-
dent world. As a result, the United States often cannot protect or
promote legitimate and'important national interests by legal regimes
of protection or regulation that stop at the water's edge.
Robinson, The State Department View, in ACT OF STATE AND ExTRATERRI-
TORIAL REACH 57 (J. Lacey ed. 1983); see also, A. LOWE, EXTRATERRITORiAL
JURISDICTION 5 (1983) (stating that limiting reach of United States antitrust
laws to United States soil would permit United States multinational corpora-
tions to evade these laws).
25. Cf United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd., 105 F. Supp. 215
1028 [Vol. 73:1023
citizens. 26 Thus, extraterritorial enforcement furthers signifi-
cant national interests embodied in United States laws. 27
Although critics charge that extraterritoriality violates other
nations' sovereignty,28 the doctrine is intended to protect the
(S.D.N.Y. 1952). In the Imperial case, the United States district court found
that Imperial and duPont had used patents and patent licenses to divide world
markets and to restrain trade in chemical products. IL at 220. After litigation
began, duPont assigned its British patents to Imperial in order to thwart any
judgment against the patent rights. To defeat this evasion, the court ordered
Imperial to reassign the rights to duPont. I Imperial claimed it could not
comply with the court's order because it already had assigned irrevocable and
exclusive licenses to another British company, BNS. The court attempted to
preserve jurisdiction over the patents and refused to recognize BNS's contract
with Imperial. I& An English court upheld those rights, however, and or-
dered specific performance of the Imperial-BNS license contract. See British
Nylon Spinners, Ltd. v. Imperial Chem. Indus., [1953] Ch. 18; Kahn-Freund,
English Contracts and American Antitrust Law: The Nylon Patent Case, 18
MOD. L. REv. 65 (1955) (discussing Imperial case).
26. Former Attorney General William French Smith told the 29th Con-
gress of the Union Internationale des Avocats, an organization of lawyers from
countries throughout the world,:
We do not wish through our laws or their enforcement to impair the
sovereignty or rights of other nations. We do not wish to police the
world and proscribe foreign conduct merely because it fails to con-
form to our own interests. Nevertheless, we intend to influence the
conduct of those international activities that have a foreseeable and
substantial impact on the legitimate concerns of our people.
Smith, supra note 13, at 3, col. 2; see also Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d
200, 206 (2d Cir. 1968) (en bane) ("Congress intended the Exchange Act to
have extraterritorial application... to protect domestic investors .... "), cert
denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
27. In addition to antitrust, other national laws extended abroad include
criminal laws and laws governing securities transactions, foreign corrupt prac-
tices, transportation, foreign assets control, and tax policy. Robinson, supia
note 24, at 58. In the antitrust context, one scholar has stated-
[Tihe legal regime of antitrust and securities and commodities market
regulation could be undermined if transactions across borders were
beyond the reach of our legal system. National security might be
eroded if we could reach only the initial consignee of a sensitive ex-
port and had no right to impose foreign end-use or end-user
restrictions.
Dam, supra note 15, at 888-89; see also Davidow, supra note 21, at 500 (stating
that United States uses extraterritoriality "not to test abstract theories of ju-
risdiction or to make work for diplomats of affected countries, but because
prosecution under national law is the only practical way to punish, remedy
and deter international offenses which cause direct, substantial injury to im-
portant economic and legal interests").
28. Canadian Ambassador to the United States Allan Gotlieb has depicted
needless extraterritorial actions as "intrusions into another's domestic affairs
and as a challenge going to the heart of [the] notion of sovereignty." Gotlieb,
supra note 12, at 452. Thus threatened, several nations have passed legislation
to block enforcement of foreign laws, regulations, or court orders. See gener-
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United States's internal domain.29
Among those statutes designed to protect United States in-
terests is the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
law.30 Although principally aimed at the "eradication of organ-
ized crime,"3' RICO also has been applied against white collar
businesses that engage in racketeering activity.32 Because
United States citizens are not the exclusive perpetrators of
racketeering activity affecting domestic interests, RICO's appli-
cation ought not be limited to domestic defendants.33 Other-
wise, foreign "racketeers" who defraud United States citizens
could escape both criminal and civil liability.34
ally Cira, The C7zallenge of Foreign Laws to Block American Antitrust Actions,
18 STAN. J. INT'L L. 247 (1982); infra notes 163-74 and accompanying text.
29. Former United States Attorney General Griffen Bell addressed this is-
sue in a speech to the Law Council of Australia. He stated: "Thus, right from
the beginning, our government concluded that if you never applied the anti-
trust laws to persons or actions located outside your territory, the result will
be that the values of others, alien to our own values, will be forced upon us in
our territory." A. LowE, supra note 24, at 4-5 (emphasis in original).
30. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
31. S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1969); see also Russello v.
United States, 464 U.S. 16, 26 (1983) (stating that RICO "was intended to pro-
vide new weapons of unprecedented scope for an assault upon organized
crime").
32. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 495 (1985) (stating
that RICO "makes it unlawful for 'any person'--not just mobsters-to [violate
its provisions] through a pattern of racketeering activity"); id. at 499 (stating
that legitimate businesses "enjoy neither an inherent incapacity for criminal
activity nor immunity from its consequences"); Papal v. Cremosnik, 635 F.
Supp. 1402, 1411 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (stating that "to the extent RICO is used as a
weapon against 'white collar crime,' this purpose is not contrary to the intent
of Congress but is in fact one of the 'benefits' Congress saw the Act as provid-
ing."). See also Oversight on Civil RICO Suits Brought Under 18 U.S.C. 1964
(c), 1985: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st
Sess. 754, 761-66 (statement of I. Nathan on behalf of American Property and
Casualty Insurance Industry); Goldsmith, RICO and "Pattern' The Search for
"Continuity Plus Relationship," 73 CORNELL L. REv. 401, 407 (1988) (discuss-
ing unsuccessful attempts by legitimate business and organized crime defend-
ants to limit RICO's application); infra note 67 (discussing problems of white
collar crime and fraud generally).
33. See infra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
34. See Fricano, supra note 2, at 206 (stating that allowing foreign "racke-
teers" to escape prosecution would defeat goal of eliminating organized crime
from United States economy). RICO's extraterritorial application also sup-
ports the extraterritorial application of other United States laws. For exam-
ple, Professor G. Robert Blakey observed that of the three types of force to
which a company may resort-violence, or the threat of it, deception, and mar-
ket power--antitrust law regulates only the last, while RICO concentrates on
the first two. Blakey, In Antitrus4 Tort and RICO Reform, Obvious Goals
Cover p Deep Issues, Nat'l L. J., Oct. 13, 1986, at 26, col. 4. RICO cannot
reach all fraud committed by foreign defendants against United States citizens.
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Even so, attempts to enforce RICO extraterritorially are
likely to face serious jurisdictional obstacles.35 Each claim re-
In addition to limitations imposed by extraterritorial jurisdictional require-
ments, discussed in this Article, RICO contains self-imposed restrictions. For
example, because RICO requires that the criminal acts be committed in a "pat-
tern," see infra notes 50-51, only serious frauds fall within its scope.
35. In addition to the jurisdictional problems discussed in this Article, var-
ious defenses may defeat extraterritorial claims. The doctrine of sovereign
compulsion shields a defendant from liability if the defendant can show that a
foreign government compelled the prohibited action. See, e.g., Inter-American
Refining Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. .291 (D. Del. 1970). In
Texaco Maracaibo, the defendants allegedly participated in a boycott by refus-
ing to sell Venezuelan crude oil to Inter-American Refining Corp. The district
court granted Texaco Maracaibo's motion for summary judgment on the
ground that Venezuelan regulatory authorities compelled the boycott, giving
Texaco Maracaibo a complete defense. I&i at 1301. The court stated: '"hen a
nation compels a trade practice, firms there have no choice but to obey. Acts
of business become effectively acts of the sovereign." Id. at 1298.
The Swiss Watchmakers case, see supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text,
illustrates an exception to the sovereign compulsion doctrine. The United
States district court refused to acknowledge sovereign compulsion because the
Swiss government merely had endorsed, encouraged, and approved of the de-
fendants' conduct; it had not actually compelled it. United States v. Watch-
makers of Switz. Information Center, Inc., 1963 Trade Cas. 70,600 (S.D.N.Y.
1962), order modified, 1965 Trade Cas. 71,352 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). In addition, the
United States Justice Department maintains that the compelled act must take
place within the territory of the compelling government. See ANTITRUST DIVI-
SION, U.S. DEP'T. OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST GuiDE FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERA-
TIONS 51, 55 (1977). In Texaco Maracaibo, for example, the Justice
Department argued that because the boycott occurred in the United States,
the sovereign compulsion doctrine did not apply. Joelson, International Anti-
trust. Problems and Defenses, 15 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1121, 1130-31 (1983).
A second defense to extraterritorial jurisdiction, sovereign immunity, pre-
vents a foreign government from being sued in United States courts for its
public acts. Congress enacted this doctrine as the Foreign Sovereign Immuni-
ties Act, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (1976) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-
1611 (Supp. IV 1986)). Under the statute, however, foreign states are not im-
mune if:
"[1] the adtion is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the
United States by the foreign state; or [2] upon an act performed in the
United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign
state elsewhere; or [3] upon an act outside the territory of the United
States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state
elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United States
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (Supp. IV 1986); see, eg., Outboard Marine Corp. v.
Pezetel, 461 F. Supp. 384, 394-95 (D. Del. 1978) (holding that Polish govern-
ment's manufacture and importation of golf carts constituted commercial ac-
tivity and therefore trading company could not rely on sovereign immunity).
The court refused to apply the commercial exception to sovereign immunity in
International Ass'n of Machinists v. Organization of Petroleum Ezporting
Countries, 477 F. Supp. 553 (C.D. Cal. 1979), and dismissed antitrust claims
against the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) on the
ground that OPEC's price-setting methods constituted protected government
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quires jurisdiction over both the legal claim 36 and the parties. 3 7
In extraterritorial litigation, these requirements pose special
problems38 that may restrict RICO's reach.
action. Id. at 569. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit agreed that sovereign immu-
nity had relevance, but chose to affirm under the act of state doctrine. Inter-
national Ass'n of Machinists v. Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries, 649 F.2d 1354, 1361-62 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163
(1982).
Under the act of state doctrine, "[e]very sovereign State is bound to re-
spect the independence of every other sovereign State, and the courts of one
country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another done
within its own territory." Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897).
The act of state doctrine differs from sovereign immunity in that a private
party may claim the former defense, for which no clearly recognized exception
for commercial activities exists. J. vTOOD & K. BREWSTER, Supra note 5,
§ 8.03. The act of state doctrine also differs from the sovereign compulsion
doctrine in that the sovereign need not actually compel the defendant's action
under the former doctrine. Id. In Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos, 818
F.2d 1473 (9th Cir. 1987), the district court used the act of state doctrine to bar
extraterritorial RICO claims against former Philippines ruler Ferdinand
Marcos. Because Marcos gained Philippine assets through the exercise of gov-
ernmental authority, United States courts could not assert jurisdiction. The
court of appeals affirmed, stating. "Once the acts in question are identified as
governmental in character, our courts have uniformly refused to question the
integrity or nobility of the reasons underlying them." Id. at 1485 (citations
omitted).
36. See infra notes 74-93 and accompanying text.
37. See infra notes 94-154 and accompanying text.
38. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909), the
first extraterritorial antitrust case, illustrates these problems. The American
Banana Company complained that the United Fruit Company had monopo-
lized and restrained Central America's banana trade with the United States by
driving American Banana off its plantation, gratuitously overbidding, inducing
employees to leave their jobs, and committing conspiratorial acts within the
United States. Id at 355. The Supreme Court addressed American Banana's
assertion of jurisdiction as follows:
It is obvious that, however stated, the plaintiff's case depends on sev-
eral rather startling propositions. In the first place the acts causing
the damage.were done, so far as appears, outside the jurisdiction of
the United Sates and within that of other states. It is surprising to
hear it argued that they were governed by the act of Congress.
Id; see J. ATWooD & K. BREWSTER, supra note 5, § 6.03 (discussing the Banana
case, its applicability today, and how courts have distinguished the case); see
also United States v. Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1976-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
61, 225 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (involving suit solely against United States publishing
houses for exclusive cross-licensing of copyrighted books, although British
firms likely were predominantly responsible). The United States Justice De-
partment revealed that the British publishing houses were excluded from the
Addison-Wesley case "because of issues of personal jurisdiction." Proposed
Consent Judgment and Competitive Impact Statement Thereon, 41 Fed. Reg.
32,615, 32,618 (1976).
For an example of jurisdictional problems in a RICO context, see Michel-
son v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 709 F. Supp. 1270, 1285
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This Article considers potential barriers to civil RICO liti-
gation 'against foreign defendants and provides a framework for
analyzing the extraterritorial application of RICO. In large
part, this framework draws on current practice under other
United States statutes applied to foreign conduct.3 9 To the de-
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) (finding no jurisdiction under RICO because foreign service of
process lacking); Nordic Bank PLC v. Trend Group, Ltd., 619 F. Supp. 542, 564
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (same); Soltex Polymer Corp. v. Fortex Indus., 590 F. Supp.
1453, 1460 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (same), aff'd, 832 F.2d 1325 (2d Cir. 1987).
39. For example, United States antitrust laws have been applied extrater-
ritorially for more than 40 years. See, ag., United States v. Aluminum Co. of
Am., 148 F.2d 416, 444 (2d Cir. 1945) (stating that alleged foreign "agreements
would clearly have been unlawful, had they been made within the United
States; and it follows ... that both were unlawful, though made abroad, if they
were intended to affect imports and did affect them"); see also J. ATWOOD &
K. BREwsTER, supra note 5, §§ 2.01-.16 (discussing history of antitrust extrater-
ritoriality). Federal securities laws also have a history of extraterritorial appli-
cation. See, e.g., Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir. 1968) (en
banc) (stating that even though challenged transactions were effected outside
United States, "Congress intended the Exchange Act to have extraterritorial
application"), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969); see generally Thomas, Extrater-
ritorial Application of the United States Securities Laws: The Need for a Bal-
anced Policy, 7 J. CORP. L. 189 (1982) (discussing foreign application of United
States securities law).
RICO's link to antitrust and securities laws provides a sound basis for bor-
rowing solutions to extraterritorial problems. Professor G. Robert Blakey, ju-
dicial drafter of the statute, has noted that RICO was modeled on both of
these statutory schemes. Blakey, supra note 34, at 26. In addition, all three
statutes share parallel public and private, and criminal and civil, enforcement
mechanisms. Id Indeed, RICO's history establishes the government's intent
to use antitrust approaches in dealing with organized crime. See generally
Blakey, supra note 7, at 249-80 (noting that Department of Justice attempted
to combat organized crime by using antitrust theories imaginatively). At one
time, the Department of Justice attacked the criminal infiltration of various
unions by using antitrust theories. See, e.g., Los Angeles Meat & Provision
Drivers Union v. United States, 371 U.S. 94, 103 (1962) (affirming finding of
Sherman Act violations by union); United States v. Pennsylvania Refuse Re-
moval Ass'n, 357 F.2d 806, 807 (3d Cir. 1966) (affirming finding of Sherman Act
violations by association of refuse firms), cert denied, 384 U.S. 961 (1966).
Later, as Congress drafted RICO, Senator Hruska observed: "The bill is inno-
vative in the sense that it vitalizes procedures which have been tried and
proved in the antitrust field and applies them into the organized crime field
where they have been seldom used before." Blakey, supra note 7, at 261 n.65
(citing 115 CONG. REC. 6993 (1969)). Senator McClellan noted that RICO
"draws heavily upon the remedies developed in the field of antitrust... The
many references to antitrust cases are necessary because the particular equita-
ble remedies desired have been brought to their greatest development in this
field, and in many instance they are the primary precedents for the remedies
in this bill." Id. at 263 n.71 (citing 115 CONG. REc. 9567 (1969)). The Supreme
Court recently traced the similarities between RICO and the antitrust laws.
See Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 107 S. Ct. 2759
(1987). In Malley-Duff, the Court held that all treble damage RICO actions
would be governed by the four-year statute of limitations found in the Clayton
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gree that existing extraterritorial jurisprudence does not ad-
dress these problems adequately, however, this Article proposes
legislative solutions that go well beyond current law. Part I re-
views the nature and structure of RICO. Part II sets out juris-
dictional barriers to the extraterritorial application of RICO
and offers solutions drawn from other laws that have been ap-
plied extraterritorially. Finally, Part Ill examines the extrater-
ritorial provisions in recent RICO reform proposals and offers
new solutions for consideration.
I. THE NATURE AND STRUCTURE OF RICO
RICO provides both civil and criminal sanctions40 against
persons engaged in "enterprise criminality."'4 ' Because RICO
Act. Id. at 2767. The Court borrowed from the Clayton Act because RICO's
civil provisions were expressly patterned on this antitrust statute and because
both statutes remedy economic injury by providing for the recovery of treble
damages, costs, and attorneys' fees. Id. at 2765. The Court stressed that "we
believe that [the Clayton Act] offers the closest analogy to civil RICO." Id. at
2764. See also Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 241
(1987) (stating that "'clearest current in [RICO] history is reliance on the
Clayton Act model!" (quoting Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 489
(1985))); see generally Nathan, Opinion, 6 RICO L. REP. 658 (Nov. 1987) (dis-
cussing Malley-Duff and McMahon as providing evidence that antitrust prece-
dent applies to civil RICO analysis).
In addition to the antitrust and securities statutes, federal drug control
laws also have been extended extraterritorially. For example, in 1970 Con-
gress enacted the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act,
Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (1970) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 801 (1982)), sev-
eral provisions of which apply specifically to conduct outside the United
States. Thus, 21 U.S.C. § 959 makes it unlawful to manufacture or distribute
controlled substances intending or knowing that they will be imported unlaw-
fully into the United States. 21 U.S.C. § 959 (1982). Section 959 states: "This
section is intended to reach acts of manufacture or distribution committed
outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States." Ida; see, e.g., United
States v. Winter, 509 F.2d 975, 990-91 (5th Cir.) (affirming finding of jurisdic-
tion over Jamaican nationals charged with conspiring to import controlled sub-
stance), cert denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975); see generally N. ABRAMs, FEDERAL
CRII NAL LAw AND ITS ENFORCEMENT 352-407 (1986) (discussing extraterrito-
rial jurisdiction under § 959). Federal drug control laws and RICO alike are
aimed at eradicating criminal activity; indeed, the Drug Enforcement Agency
relies on RICO as a valuable tool in combating drug traffickers. See 8 CoN-
TEMP. DRUG PROBLEMS 291, 299 (1979) (citing COMPrROLLER GENERAL OF THE
U.S., 1979 REPORT TO CONGRESS) ("DEA believes that traffickers' financial re-
sources can be attacked through effective use of... the RICO statute .... ").
40. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Section 1963 provides
for criminal penalties including imprisonment, fines, and forfeiture of prop-
erty. Section 1964 provides for civil remedies.
41. See United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322, 1330 (5th Cir. 1983) (stating
that enterprise criminality consists of "'all types of organized criminal behav-
ior... [ranging] from simple political corruption to sophisticated white-collar
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focuses on enterprises, it strikes at the organizational founda-
tion of systemic crime.42 RICO's civil sanctions authorize treble
damages and reasonable attorney's fees, and may subject viola-
tors to reorganization, divestiture, and other equitable reme-
dies. 43  RICO also subjects violators to enhanced criminal
crime schemes to traditional Mafia-type endeavors!" (quoting Blakey & Get-
tings, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO): Basic Con-
cepts-Criminal and Civil Remedies, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 1009, 1013-14 (1980))), cert.
denied, 465 U.S. 1005 (1984); see also United States v. Neapolitan, 791 F.2d 489,
500 (7th Cir. 1986) (discussing "central role" of enterprise criminality in devel-
opment of RICO statute).
42. Crime, in combination with an enterprise, may flourish as long as that
association remains connected to criminal activity. Therefore, although indi-
viduals are prosecuted and convicted, the criminal enterprise may continue to
exist and perpetuate any illegal objectives. RICO's strength lies in its ability
to combat continuing criminal activity by attacking the enterprise. See gener-
ally Goldsmith, RICO and Enterprise Criminality: A Response to Gerard E.
Lynch, 88 COLuM. L. REv. 774, 774-76 (1988). The Supreme Court examined
this notion of enterprise and continuity in United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S.
576 (1981):
The enterprise is an entity, for present purposes a group of persons
associated together for a common purpose of engaging in a course of
conduct .... The... [enterprise] is proved by evidence of an ongoing
organization, formal or informal, and by evidence that the various as-
sociates function as a continuing unit.
Id at 583.
43. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) states: "Any person injured in his business or
property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue there-
for in any appropriate United States district court and shall recover threefold
the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attor-
ney's fee." 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982). See generally Note, Treble Damages
Under RICO: Characterization and Computation, 61 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 526
(1986) (discussing treble damages under RICO as remedy against organized
crime).
18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) states:
The district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction to pre-
vent and restrain violations of section 1962 of this chapter by issuing
appropriate orders, including, but not limited to: ordering any person
to divest himself of any interest, direct or indirect, in any enterprise;
imposing reasonable restrictions on the future activities or invest-
ments of any person, including, but not limited to, prohibiting any
person from engaging in the same type of endeavor as the enterprise
engaged in, the activities of which affect interstate or foreign com-
merce; or ordering dissolution or reorganization of any enterprise,
making due provision for the rights of innocent persons.
Federal courts disagree on whether RICO authorizes equitable relief to private
plaintiffs. See, e.g., Religious Technology Center v. Wollersheim, 796 F.2d
1076, 1088 (9th Cir. 1986), cart denied, 107 S.Ct. 1336 (1987) (no injunctive re-
lief to private civil RICO plaintiffs); Miller v. Affiliated Fin. Corp., 600 F.
Supp. 987, 994 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (same); DeMent v. Abbott Capital Corp., 589 F.
Supp. 1378, 1382-83 (N.D. IM. 1984) (same). Contra Aetna Casualty & Surety
Co. v. Liebowitz, 570 F. Supp. 908, 910-911 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), qff'd on other
grounds, 730 F.2d 905 (2d Cir. 1984) (injunctive relief available to private civil
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penalties that include fines, imprisonment, and forfeiture of
assets.44
RICO generally prohibits four types of enterprise-related
activity:45 investing income derived from a pattern of racke-
teering activity in an interstate enterprise (section 1962(a)); 46
acquiring or maintaining an interest in an interstate enterprise
through a pattern of racketeering activity (section 1962(b)); 47
RICO plaintiffs); Chamber Dev. Co. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., 590 F. Supp.
1528,1540-41 (W.D. Pa. 1984) (same); cf USACO Coal Co. v. Carbomin Energy,
Inc., 539 F. Supp. 807, 814-16 (W.D. Ky.), aff'd on other grounds, 730 F.2d 905
(2d Cir. 1984) (assuming availability of injunctive relief to private civil RICO
plaintiffs); Marshall Field & Co. v. Icahn, 537 F. Supp. 413, 420 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)(same); Vietnamese Fishermen's Assoc. v. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, 518
F. Supp. 993, 1014 (S.D. Tex. 1981) (same); see also United States v. Local 560,
Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 581 F. Supp. 279, 337 (D.N.J. 1984) (issuing injunction
against defendants and ordering removal of union's executive board members),
qff'd, 780 F.2d 267, 295 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1140 (1986); see
generally Blakey & Cessar, Equitable Relief Under Civil RICO: Reflections on
Religious Technology Center v. Wollersheim: Will Civil RICO be Effective
Only Against White-Collar Crime?, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 526 (1987) (dis-
cussing limited availability of equitable remedies to some plaintiffs under
RICO).
44. 18 U.S.C. § 1963 states in part:
Whoever violates any provision of section 1962 of this chapter shall be
fined not more than $25,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty
years, or both, and shall forfeit to the United States (1) any interest
he has acquired or maintained in violation of [RICO], and (2) any in-
terest in, security of, claim against, or property or contractual right of
any kind affording a source of influence over, any enterprise which he
has established operated, controlled, conducted, or participated in the
conduct of, in violation of [RICO].
18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (1982).
45. RICO encompasses every manner in which an enterprise may be used
to promote crime. Cf. United States v. Neapolitan, 791 F.2d 489, 500 (7th Cir.
1986) ("The central role of the concept of enterprise under RICO cannot be
overstated. It is precisely the criminal infiltration and manipulation of organi-
zational structures that created the problems which led to the passage of
RICO."); see also infra note 51.
46. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 states in part:
It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income de-
rived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or
through collection of an unlawful debt in which such person has par-
ticipated as a principal... to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any
part of such income, or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition of
any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise
which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or for-
eign commerce.
18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1982) (emphasis added).
47. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) states:
"It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering ac-
tivity or through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain, directly
or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in,
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conducting the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of
racketeering activity (section 1962(c));48 and conspiring to vio-
late any of the preceding provisions (section 1962(d)).4 9
Each of these terms is defined more specifically elsewhere
in the statute. Racketeering activity, for example, encom-
poasses a broad range of offenses, including white collar crimes
such as mail fraud, wire fraud, and securities fraud.50 To trig-
ger RICO liability, such activity usually must constitute a "pat-
tern"--a minimum of two racketeering acts occurring within a
ten-year period 51-- and must have some connection with an "en-
terprise" 52 that affects "interstate or foreign commerce."53
or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce." 18 U.S.C.
§ 1962(b) (1982) (emphasis added).
48. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) states:
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with
any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate
or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly,
in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racke-
teering activity or collection of unlawful debt
18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1982) (emphasis added).
49. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) states: "It shall be unlawful for any person to con-
spire to violate any of the provisions of subsections (a),(b), or (c) of this sec-
tion." 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (1982).
50. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1982). Racketeering as defined may be broken into
four categories: 1) violence; 2) provision of illegal goods and services; 3) corrup-
tion in labor or among public officials; and 4) commercial and other forms of
fraud. Blakey, supra note 7, at 300-06.
51. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1982). In Sedima, S.P.L.R v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S.
479 (1985), however, the Supreme Court suggested that a pattern arises
through "continuity plus relationship," not merely through "two isolated acts
of racketeering activity." Id. at 496 n.14.
Because RICO requires proof of a ' pattern of racketeering activity," 18
U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1982) (emphasis added), the meaning of pattern is essential to
interpreting the statute. Note that certain crimes do not require proof of a
pattern, however, to make out a RICO cause of action. For example, the pat-
tern element does not restrict "collection of an unlawful debt." 18 U.S.C.
§ 1962(b). For a discussion of the debate that has raged over the pattern re-
quirement, see generally Goldsmith, supra note 32 (favoring a broad interpre-
tation of pattern), and Note, Clarifying a Pattern of Confusion. A Multifactor
Approach to Civil RICO's Pattern Requirement, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1745 (1988)
(favoring a restrictive interpretation of pattern). In H.J Inc v. Northwestern
Bell Tel. Co., 109 S. Ct. 2893 (1989), the Supreme Court rejected a narrow con-
struction of the pattern element. The Court held that "[w]hat a plaintiff or
prosecutor must prove is continuity of racketeering activity, or its threat, sim-
pliciter." Id- at 2901. In attempting to "delineate" this requirement, however,
the Court provided an array of illustrations and limitations that will ensure
continuation of the pattern debate.
52. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text. To fall within RICO's
proscriptions, racketeering activity must connect in some way to an enterprise.
See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)-(d) (1982). Thus, a pattern of such activity can be con-
ducted against an enterprise, through an enterprise, or to benefit an enter-
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RICO defines enterprise broadly to include both licit and illicit
entities, 4 and subjects to liability "any individual or entity ca-
pable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property."595 In
civil actions, such violators are liable to anyone injured in busi-
ness or property by reason of statutory misconduct 5 6
Moreover, just as RICO does not exclude legitimate busi-
nesses from its scope,5 7 neither the statutory language nor case
prise. I The enterprise may act, depending on the case, as a perpetrator of
the illicit conduct, see, ag., United States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961, 990-91 (11th
Cir. 1982) (shrimp business operated by pattern of mail fraud and interstate
transportation of money obtained by fraud), cerL denied, 459 U.S. 1170 (1983),
as a prize targeted for illicit acquisition, see, e.g., United States v. Goins, 593
F.2d 88, 89-90 (8th Cir.) (bribe money used to purchase tavern), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 827 (1979), as the victim of racketeering activity, see, ag., United
States v. LeRoy, 687 F.2d 610, 617 (2d Cir. 1982) (embezzlement of union
funds), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1174 (1983), or as an instrumentality aiding the
commission of crimes, see, e.g., United States v. Palmeri, 630 F.2d 192, 199 (3d
Cir. 1980) (kickback scheme in union contracting), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 967(1981). For further discussion, see Blakey, supra note 7, at 307-25. As the
cited cases suggest, the enterprise requirement encompasses cases involving
white collar crime. See e.g., United States v. Benny, 786 F.2d 1410, 1413 (9th
Cir.) (personal real estate business operated by fraud), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
1017 (1986); United States v. Weisman, 624 F.2d 1118, 1120 (2d Cir.) (theater
operated through pattern of securities and bankruptcy fraud), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 871 (1980).
53. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1982) (emphasis added); see United States v.
Robinson, 763 F.2d 778, 781 (6th Cir. 1985) (interstate nexus need be only mini-
mal); United States v. Morelli, 643 F.2d 402, 411 (6th Cir.) (interstate phone
call provides sufficient nexus), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 912 (1981); see also United
States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430, 440-42 (2d Cir. 1974) (discussing foreign com-
merce connection). But cf. McCracken v. City of Chinook, 652 F. Supp. 1300,
1307-08 (D. Mont. 1987) (finding commerce nexus insufficient to support RICO
case); Brekke v. Volcker, 652 F. Supp. 651, 655 (D. Mont. 1987) (same).
54. RICO's definition of enterprise includes "any individual, partnership,
corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of indi-
viduals associated in fact although not a legal entity." 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4)(1982).
55. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3) (1982) (emphasis added).
56. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982); see, e.g., Crocker v. FDIC, 826 F.2d 347, 351
(5th Cir. 1987) (excluding lost profit opportunity), cert denied, 108 S. Ct. 1075
(1988); Drake v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 782 F.2d 638, 644 (6th Cir. 1986) (excluding
personal injury from recovery under RICO); Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053,
1058-59 (8th Cir. 1982) (holding RICO provides recovery for financial loss),
qff'd on rehearing, 710 F.2d 1361 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert, denied, 464 U.S.
1008 (1983).
57. See supra note 32. The legislative history demonstrates that Congress
intended RICO to apply to white collar crimes. Forerunners to the RICO stat-
ute, S. 2187, S. 1623, and S. 1861, excluded white collar offenses from the list of
predicate crimes. See S. 1861, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 CONG. REc. 9568-7
(1969); S. 1623, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 CONG. REc. 6995-96 (1969); S. 2187,
89th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(a), 111 CONG. REC. 14,680 (1965). When S. 1861 was
finally integrated with the proposed Organized Crime Control Act of 1969,
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law excludes businesses not located domestically. 8 Only re-
cently, however, has RICO been used against foreign viola-
tors.5 9 Because RICO targets activity recognized as criminal in
which Congress eventually enacted, predicate offenses pertaining to white col-
lar crime were added. 116 CONG. REC. 581 (1970) (text of RICO after integra-
tion); see Blakey, supra note 7, at 265-68; see generally Goldsmith, supra note
42, at 776-90 (disussing RICO's application to enterprises).
58. See, eg., In re All Terrain Vehicles Litig., No. 88-237 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 23,
1989) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file)(denying foreign defendant's motion to
dismiss); Chamarac Properties, N.V. v. Pike, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,761
(S.D.N.Y. 1988) (same); North Carolina v. Alexander & Alexander Servs., 680
F. Supp. 746, 750 (E.D.N.C.) (same), certificationfor immediate appeal denied,
685 F. Supp. 114, 117 (E.D.N.C. 1988); Shulton, Inc. v. Optel Corp., 1987-1 Trade
Cas. (CCH) 67,436 (D.N.J. Sept. 29, 1986) (same).
In United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1105 (1975), the court held that a foreign corporation may be a RICO en-
terprise, rejecting efforts to contain RICO's extraterritorial scope: "RICO's
legislative history leaves no room for doubt that Congress intended to deal
generally with the influences of organized crime on the American economy
and not merely with its infiltration into domestic enterprises." Id at 439 (em-
phasis added). The court further stated:
[W]e are not breaking new ground in applying federal criminal sanc-
tions to activities involving both American and foreign contacts ....
The Sherman Act ... has been held to proscribe conspiracies in re-
straint of trade which were entered into in the United States but car-
ried out both here and abroad, assuming the requisite effect on
commerce.... And, in dealing with one of the antifraud provision of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, . . . we have held that where
there is substantial United States activity and Americans are hur4 it
is immaterial that the corporation is foreign.
Id at 440 (emphasis added). Parness's refusal to limit RICO to domestic appli-
cation is consistent with Supreme Court precedent that construes the statute
broadly. See, eg., Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Inrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499 (1985) (re-
jecting narrow interpretation that would exclude white-collar institutions
from RICO liability); Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16,27 (1983) (rejecting
attempts to limit forfeiture provision); United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576,
587-90 (1981) (rejecting attempts to exclude illegitimate enterprises).
59. Plaintiffs have filed approximately one dozen extraterritorial RICO
cases in United States courts, four of which were dismissed for failure to prove
jurisdiction. See Michelson v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 709 F.
Supp. 1270, 1285 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (finding no jurisdiction over foreign defend-
ants); Huang v. Sentinel Gov't Sec., 657 F. Supp. 485, 491-92 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)
(same); Ancilla Domini Health Servs. v. Communications Assocs., No. 84-C-
2771a (N.D. Ill. Nov. 5, 1985) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (same); Nordic
Bank PLC v. Trend Group, L., 619 F. Supp. 542, 564 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (same);
Soltex Polymer Corp. v. Fortex Indus., 590 F. Supp. 1453, 1460 (E.D.N.Y. 1984)
(same), affl'd, 832 F.2d 1325 (2d Cir. 1987). In another five cases, plaintiffs es-
tablished jurisdiction, but their RICO claims were stayed or dismissed. See Re-
public of Phil. v. Marcos, 818 F.2d 1473, 1490 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding RICO
claims barred by act of state and political question doctrines); S.A. Mineracao
da Trinidade-Samitri v. Utah Int'l, Inc., 745 F.2d 190, 191 (2d Cir. 1984) (staying
"non-arbitrable" RICO claims pending arbitration of other claims); FMC Corp.
v. Varonos, No. 87-C-9640 (N.D. IMI. Oct. 20, 1988) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist
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most nations,60 it may not be vulnerable to some foreign criti-
cism historically directed against extraterritorial litigation.61
Given RICO's controversial domestic status,62 however, its ex-
traterritorial extension is likely to encounter hostility from
both United States and foreign critics. Controversy surround-
ing RICO stems, for example, from its opponents' argument
that the "racketeering" label is prejudicial to defendants and
provides unfair leverage in settlement negotiations.6 3 Critics
also claim that the availability of treble damages encourages ex-
file) (finding RICO claims insufficient); Selman v. American Sports Under-
writers, No. 84-0099-C (W.D. Va. Oct. 4, 1988) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist
file) (same); Chisholm & Col. v. Bank of Jamaica, 643 F. Supp. 1393, 1404-05
(S.D. Fla. 1986) (same).
Courts have maintained RICO causes of action against foriegn defendants
in only four cases. See In re All Terrain Vehicles Litig., No. 88-237 (E.D. Pa.
Feb. 23, 1989) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (denying foreign defendant's
motion to dismiss); Chamarac Properties, N.V. v. Pike, Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 93,761 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (same); North Carolina v. Alexander & Alexan-
der Servs., 680 F. Supp. 746, 750 (E.D.N.C.), certificatiohfor immediate appeal
denied, 685 F. Supp. 114, 117 (E.D.N.C. 1988) (same); Shulton, Inc. v. Optel
Corp., 1987-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 67,436 (D.N.J. 1986) (same).
60. Acts, a pattern of which may constitute a RICO violation, include
murder, kidnapping, arson, robbery, narcotics dealing, counterfeiting, white
slave trafficking, and various forms of fraud. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1982).
61. Most nations agree that a nation's law can be applied to criminal acts
committed outside national borders but having adverse effects within these
borders, but nations sometimes differ as to whether a given act is a crime.
Therefore, attempts to assert authority over foreign acts that affect the domes-
tic economy but are deemed criminal only by the complaining nation create
conflict. A. HERMANN, supra note 13, at 7; see generally infra note 89 (discuss-
ing conflict arising from such assertions of jurisdiction). The foreign applica-
tion of United States antitrust laws, for example, provoked considerable
controversy precisely because the activities prohibited by those laws were not
deemed illegal in other nations. The British Attorney General thus told the
House of Lords: "The formation of a cartel and other activities against which
anti-trust legislation is directed are not universally recognized as unlawful.
Offences in the anti-trust category are wholly different from such offences as
piracy which are universally regarded as unlawful." Submission of the British
Attorney-General to the House of Lords, cited in In re Westinghouse Elec.
Corp. Uranium Contracts Litigation, [1978] A.C. 589, 594, quoted in Joelson,
supra note 35, at 1123.
62. See supnra note 7 (discussing controversy over civil RICO suits against
legitimate businesses); see generally Oversight on Civil RICO suits: Hearings
Before the Senate Comm on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) (illus-
trating various positions regarding RICO); Goldsmith & Keith, Civil RICO
Abuse: The Allegations in Context, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REV. 55 (discussing contro-
versy over RICO).
63. See, e.g., RICO Reform~: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal
Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st & 2nd Sess., pt.1,
153, 182 (1985) ("The 'racketeering' label ... can work severe damage on pro-
fessional and business reputations.").
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tortionate civil claims and permits windfall recoveries.64 In ad-
dition, the use of RICO against defendants other than
stereotypical mobsters provokes attacks on the statute and con-
tinual attempts at reform by white-collar institutions.65
RICO does not merit these criticisms. 65 Moreover, given
the pervasive nature of fraud,6 7 the statute warrants both do-
64. See Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384, 399
n.16 (7th Cir. 1984) (noting judicial commentary regarding "in terroremr settle-
ment value that the threat of treble damages may add to spurious claims"),
aff'd on other grounds, 473 U.S. 606 (1985); Wolin v. Hanley Dawson Cadillac,
Inc., 636 F. Supp. 890, 891 (N.D. 111. 1986) (stating that "RICO's lure of treble
damages and attorneys' fees draws litigants and lawyers... like lemmings to
the sea"). But see Goldsmith, Civil RICO Reform: The Basis for Compromise,
71 MINN. L. REV. 827, 837 (1987) (examining criticism of treble damages and
finding complaints unjustified).
65. See Bouchei, Closing the RICO Floodgates in the Aftermath of Sedima,
31 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 133 (1986). According to Boucher, RICO has created:
"a new form of extortion sweeping the country. Business people of all
types, and professionals such as accountants, bankers, insurance
agents, and securities brokers are among its primary victims. They
are being threatened with a weapon that can inflict huge damages and
bring unjustified shame and ruin upon them."
I&L at 133. See generally Note, Congress Responds to Sedima: Is There a Con-
tract Out on Civil RICO?, 19 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 851 (1986) (discussing proposals
to limit scope of RICO).
66. For a rebuttal of these criticisms, see generally Goldsmith, supra note
64.
67. Many RICO suits against legitimate businesses involve allegations of
fraud. The Department of Justice has released statistics that place losses due
to fraud at more than $200 billion annually. United States Dep't of Justice,
Annual Report of the Attorney General 42 (1984); see Goldsmith, supra note
64, at 833 n.31 (discussing economic losses caused by fraud; see also J.
BOLOGNA, CORPORATE FRAUD 9 (1984) (noting 1980 survey reported that 117 of
largest corporations in United States were convicted of white-collar crimes
during 1970s). During 1988, the Beach-Nut, Hertz, and defense procurement
scandals demonstrated that fraud and white-collar crime continue to plague
society. Cf. N.Y. .Times, Apr. 9, 1989, § 3, at 4, col. 3 (discussing Beach-Nut
fraud case); id. Aug. 6, 1988, § 1, at 29, col. 1 (discussing Hertz fraud case); icl.
Apr. 14, 1989, § A, at 1, col. 1 (discussing defense procurement fraud case).
In assessing the noneconomic impact of fraud, a survey conducted by the
New York Times and CBS News found that trust in United States institutions
and officials is eroding. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., LIBRARY OF CON-
GRESS, UPDATE OF CRS REPORT ENTITLED "WHITE COLLAR CRIMES: THE PROB-
LEM AND THE FEDERAL RESPONSE" 2-3 (1986). For example, only 32% of those
polled believe that United States corporate executives are honest. Id- Fur-
thermore, 85% said that most white collar offenders get away with their viola-
tions. I& A 1984 congressional report on fraud in the nation's financial
institutions noted:
Despite such enormous losses, neither the banking nor the criminal
justice systems impose effective sanctions or punishment to deter
white-collar bank fraud. The few insiders who are singled out for
civil sanctions by the banking agencies are usually either fined de
minimis amounts or simply urged to resign. The few who are crimi-
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mestic and extraterritorial application.63 For example, foreign
groups have engaged in schemes that systematically defraud
United States citizens.6 9 Such foreign activity harms its victims
in the United States no less than does fraudulent activity of do-
mestic origin.
H. JURISDICTIONAL BARRIERS TO
EXTRATERRITORIAL RICO SUITS
Although courts have held that RICO applies to foreign as
well as to United States defendants, 70 no extraterritorial RICO
case has resulted in a judgment. 1 Jurisdictional requirements
have raised serious obstacles.7 2 To accept an extraterritorial
RICO case, a court must have prescriptive, adjudicative, and en-
forcement jurisdiction.7 3 Although lack of adjudicative jurisdic-
nally prosecuted usually serve little, if any, time in prison for thefts
that often cost millions of dollars.
MODEL STATE LEGISLATION ON SOPHISTICATED CRIMINAL ACTIVITY 45 (1985).
68. See FMC Corp. v. Varonos, No. 87-C-9640 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 20, 1988)
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file). In denying the foreign defendants' motion
to dismiss for forum non conveniens, the Varonos court stated: "There is a
strong public policy interest in providing a remedy in this forum for an Illinois
corporation allegedly victimized by a foreign national who systematically ef-
fectuated a fraudulent scheme by communications directed into this forum."
I&i
69. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON ORGANIZED CRIME, REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT AND THE ATrORNEY GENERAL, THE IMPACT: ORGANIZED CRIME To-
DAY 51-128 (1986) (describing organized foreign groups operating in United
States); see also PRESIDENT'S COMIUSSION ON ORGANIZED CRIME, ORGANIZED
CRIME AND MONEY LAUNDERING 174-75 (1984) (describing foreign banks in-
volved in money laundering schemes aimed at hiding illegal profits).
70. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
71. See supra note 59.
72. See, e.g., Michelson v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 709 F.
Supp. 1270, 1285 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (finding no jurisdiction over foreign defend-
ants because foreign service of process lacking); Huang v. Sentinel Gov't Sec.,
657 F. Supp. 485, 491-92 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (finding no jurisdiction over foreign
defendants because minimum contacts lacking); Ancilla Domini Health Servs.
v. Communications Assocs., No. 84-C-2771 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 5, 1985) (LEXIS,
Genfed library, Dist file) (finding no jurisdiction over foreign defendants be-
cause personal jurisdiction lacking); Nordic Bank PLC v. Trend Group, L., 619
F. Supp. 542, 564 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (denying jurisdiction over foreign defendants
because foreign service of process lacking); Soltex Polymer Corp. v. Fortex In-
dus., 590 F. Supp. 1453, 1460 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (same), aff'd, 832 F.2d 1325 (2d
Cir. 1987).
73. Traditionally, discussions on international law divide jurisdiction into
the right to prescribe rules and the right to enforce them. J. SWEENEY, C. OLI.
vER & N. LEECH, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL Sys-
TEM 89 (2d ed. 1981). The Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of
the United States considers jurisdiction in three categories:
(a) jurisdiction to prescribe, ie., the authority of a state to make its
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tion appears to be the most frequent basis for rejecting an
extraterritorial case, each jurisdictional predicate merits careful
consideration.
A. JURISDICTION TO PRESCRIBE
Jurisdiction to prescribe, also known as subject matter ju-
risdiction 7 4 provides judicial authority over the topic of a dis-
pute.7 5 Under international law, prescriptive authority may
derive from territorial, nationality, passive personality, univer-
sality, or protective principles.7 6 These principles often work
law applicable to persons or activities; (b) jurisdiction to adjudicate,
i.e., the authority of a state to subject particular persons or things to
its judicial process; and (c) jurisdiction to enforce, ie., the authority of
a state to use the resources of government to induce or compel com-
pliance with its law.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATiONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES Part IV, introductory note (1988) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. The Re-
statement recognizes that adjudication deals primarily with judicial function
while enforcement often encompasses executive or administrative action in ad-
dition to the judicial process. Ida
74. The Restatement uses the term jurisdiction to fprescribe to avoid con-
fusion with the term subject matterjurisdiction as used in a national context.
Jurisdiction to prescribe addresses transnational activity. RESTATEMENT,
supra note 73, § 401 comment c; see also Moessle, The Basic Structure of
United States Securities Law Enforcement in International Cases, 16 CAL. W.
INT'L L.J. 1, 7 (1986) (stating that jurisdiction to prescribe is preferable term);
see generally Lowenfeld, Antitrus Interest Analysis, and the New Conflict of
Laws (Book Review), 95 HAZV. L. REV. 1976, 1980-84 (1982) (reviewing J.
ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD (2d
ed. 1981)).
75. See supra note 73. Prescriptive jurisdiction occurs when a nation, by
legislative action, executive decree, administrative regulation, or judicial deci-
sion, declares a principle or legal norm. J. SWEENEY, C. OLuVER & N. LEECH,
supra note 73, at 89. In practice, a court considering an extraterritorial case
first must ask if national law applies to the conduct in dispute.
76. United States v. King, 552 F.2d 833, 851 (9th Cir. 1976), cert, denied,
430 U.S. 966 (1977); Rocha v. United States, 288 F.2d 545, 549 n.4 (9th Cir.),
cert denied, 366 U.S. 948 (1961); 1 NAT. COMM'N ON THE REFORM OF FEDERAL
CRIMINAL LAWS, WORKING PAPERS 72-73 (1970); see also United States v. Piz-
zarusso, 388 F.2d 8, 10 (2d Cir.) (stating that "International law has recognized,
in varying degrees, five bases of jurisdiction" (citing Harvard Research in In-
ternational Law, Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. Spec.
Supp. 435, 445 (1935))), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 936 (1968); RESTATEMENT, supra
note 73, § 402 (same). Some scholars recognize as a sixth basis for extraterrito-
rial jurisdiction crimes under international law, including war crimes and
crimes against humanity. See Attorney General of Isr. v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R.
277 (Isr. Sup. Ct. 1962). Most authorities, however, treat this category as en-
compassed by the universality principle. Cf. I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUB-
LIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 305 (3d ed. 1979) (noting distinction between
universality and crimes under international law).
1989] RICO 1043
MINESOTA LAW REVIEW
together in practice,77 but are best understood when treated
separately.
Territoriality derives from the internationally accepted
right78 to govern persons and events occurring within national
boundaries.7 9 The territorial principle therefore fixes jurisdic-
tion at the site of an occurrence,80 conferring jurisdiction on
77. The passive personality principle, for example, is similar to the protec-
tive principle, and the nationality, territorial, and protective principles also in-
terrelate. I. BROWNLIE, supra note 76, at 306; see, e.g., King, 552 F.2d at 851-52
(finding jurisdiction established under both nationality and terrftorial princi-
ples); United States v. Daniszewski, 380 F. Supp. 113, 11516 (E.D.N.Y. 1974)
(finding jurisdiction established under nationality principle and indicating
court was prepared to rely on protective principle as well).
78. See Aldisert, Federal Courts and Extraterritorial Antitrust Law: En-
lightened SeWf Interest or Yankee ImperiaZism?, 5 J.L. & CoM. 415, 423 (1984)
("Because every state has a right to dictate laws governing the conduct of its
inhabitants, the territoriality basis of jurisdiction is universally recognized.
Territoriality is the most pervasive and basic principle underlying the exercise
by states of prescriptive regulatory power."); see also RESTATEMENT, supra
note 73, § 402 comment c ("The territorial principle is by far the most common
basis for the exercise of jurisdiction to prescribe, and it has generally been free
from controversy."); L BROWNLIE, supra note 76, at 300 (noting territorial prin-
ciple has "received universal recognition"); Higgins, The Legal Bases of Juris-
diction, in EXTRA-TERRiTORiAL APPLICATION OF LAWS AND RESPONSES
THERETO 5 (C. Olmstead ed. 1984) ("The existence of the territorial principle
is devoid of controversy.").
79. In The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116,
(1812), Chief Justice Marshall recognized the importance of territoriality in
defining sovereignty.
The jurisdiction of the nation, within its own territory, is necessarily
exclusive and absolute; it is susceptible of no limitation, not imposed
by itself. Any restriction upon it, deriving validity from an external
source, would imply a diminution of its sovereignty to the extent of
the restriction, and an investment of that sovereignty to the same ex-
tent in that power which could impose such restriction.
All exceptions, therefore, to the full and complete power of a na-
tion within its own territories, must be traced up to the consent of the
nation itself.
Id. at 135; see also L BROWNUE, supra note 76, at 300 (noting that territorial
principle is "but a single application of the essential territoriality of the sover-
eignty, the sum of legal competences, which a state has"); Higgins, supra note
78, at 6 (stating that "[a] state has competence to prescribe law for persons and
resources within its territory").
80. According to the Restatement, prescriptive jurisdiction exists over
"conduct that, wholly or in substantial part, takes place within [a nation's] ter-
ritory." RESTATEMENT, supra note 73, § 402(1)(a); see, e.g., Judgment of Oct.
27, 1966, Cass. civ. 2e, Fr., 1966 Bull. Civ. II 609, 47 I.L.R. 135 (1974) (holding
provision of French law applicable to "anyone who performs such an activity
on French territory" because "[t]o exempt aliens from [its] scope would re-
quire the addition to the text of an exception for which it does not provide");
Judgment of May 30, 1961, Supreme Court, Spain, 34 I.L.R. 49 (1967) (asserting
that "Spanish courts [have] jurisdiction in all civil law questions that might be
raised in Spanish territory"); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877) (noting
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United States courts, for example, over RICO violations occur-
ring within the United States. By comparison, nationality sup-
ports prescriptive jurisdiction based on the citizenship of the
offender.8 ' Hence, this principle does not grant prescriptive ju-
risdiction in an extraterritorial RICO suit against foreign de-
fendants.8 2 The third principle, passive personality, is the
obverse of nationality, conferring jurisdiction based on the na-
tionality of the victim.8 3 United States victims have not bene-
that "every state possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons
and property within its territory"); see also 1 W. FUGATE, supra note 6, § 2.4
(discussing territoriality principle as it relates to antitrust law).
81. See, e.g., Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 282 (1952) ("Con-
gress in prescribing standards of conduct for American citizens may project
the impact of its laws beyond the territorial boundaries of the United States.")
(emphasis added); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 436 (1932) ("By vir-
tue of the obligations of -citizenship, the United States retained its authority
over [an American citizen in France] and he was bound by its laws made appli-
cable to him in a foreign country."). Nationality, as a basis of jurisdiction,
stems from national sovereignty-the right of a nation to rule over its citizens.
It raises issues of what constitutes a person's nationality, or citizenship, and
how a change in nationality may affect jurisdiction. See RESTATEMENT, supra
note 73, § 402(2); L BROWNLIE, supra note 76, at 303. When nationality juris-
diction is asserted over a domestically owned subsidiary incorporated and oper-
ating in another country, for example, a conflict of nationality occurs. See, e.g.,
United States v. Vetco, Inc., 691 F.2d 1281, 1290 (9th Cir.) (requiring United
States parent company to produce documents belonging to and in possession of
Swiss subsidiary), cert denied, 454 U.S. 1098 (1981); see also A. HERMANN,
supra note 13, at 66 (participants in 1980 Ditchley Conference, experts from
United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Japan, brought to-
gether by Ditchley Foundation, reached consensus that "directives given by
the US government to foreign subsidiaries of US companies should not be in
conflict with the law of the host country"). United States officials insist that a
foreign place of incorporation or the inconsistent policies of a host state cannot
be used by an American-owned company to evade its obligations under United
States law. See CURRENT ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL ANTiTRUST 43-45 (J. Grif-
fin ed. 1981) (statement of Kingman Brewster, Jr. during interview); Davidow,
supra note 21, at 508.
82. Prescriptive jurisdiction in an extraterritorial RICO case could be
based on the nationality of United States defendants located abroad, however.
In Sanib Corp. v,. United Fruit Co., 135 F. Supp. 764 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), for exam-
ple, the court found no difficulty in exercising authority over antitrust viola-
tions allegedly committed abroad by United Fruit and its subsidiaries.
Notwithstanding the foreign location of the alleged violations, jurisdiction ex-
isted due to the company's United States citizenship. Id& at 766.
83. See, e.g., The Cutting Case Letter, Secretary of State to United States
Ambassador to Mexico (1887), reprinted in J. SWEENEY, C. OLIVER & N.
LEECH, supra note 73, at 95-98. Cutting involved the alleged libel of a Mexican
citizen by statements made and printed in the El Paso Sunday Herald, a Texas
newspaper. Id Although the crime was committed outside of Mexico and the
offender was not a Mexican national, the Chihuahua Supreme Court exercised
jurisdiction and sentenced Mr. Cutting to prison. The Mexican government
defended the court's decision, maintaining that jurisdiction was proper because
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fited from this principle, however, because United States law
does not recognize its force.8 4 The fourth principle, universal-
ity, provides jurisdiction over acts such as piracy,8 5 which are
condemned unconditionally by international law. 6 RICO viola-
the victim was a citizen of Mexico. Id. See also The S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.),
1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 22-23 (Sept. 7). (reserving opinion on validity
of the passive personality principle); supra note 14 (discussing Lotus case).
Scant authority supports the passive personality principle of prescriptive
jurisdiction. The Restatement recognizes it only in cases of terroristic attacks
targeting victims based upon their citizenship and in assassinations of govern-
ment officials. RESTATEMENT, supra note 73, § 402 comment g. One authority
comments that it is "the least justifiable ... of the various bases of jurisdiction,
and in any case certain of its applications fall under the principle of protection
and universality." I. BROWNLM, supra note 76, at 303. Although certain hi-
jacking treaties seem to rely on passive personality for jurisdiction, what actu-
ally may be involved is universality, that is, a crime universally condemned.
Higgins, supra note 78, at 14.
84. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus., 494 F. Supp. 1161,
1179 n.38 (E.D. Pa. 1980), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 723
F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983), r'ev'd on other grounds, 475 U.S. 574 (1986). According
to The Cutting Case Letter:
It has constantly been laid down in the United States as a rule of ac-
tion, that citizens of the United States can not be held answerable in
foreign countries for offenses which were wholly committed and con-
summated either in their own country or in other countries not sub-ject to the jurisdiction of the punishing state....
To say that he may be tried in another country for his offense,
simply because its object happens to be a citizen of that country,
would be to assert that foreigners coming to the United States bring
hither the penal laws of the country from which they come, and thus
subject citizens of the United States in their own country to an indefi-
nite responsibility. Such a pretension can never be admitted by this
Government.
The Cutting Case Letter, supra note 83, at 99.
85. Piracy is a universal crime because it threatens the international need
for freedom of navigation on the high seas. J. SWEENEY, C. OLUVER & N.
LEECH, supra note 73, at 120-21. Because no international penal tribunal ex-
ists, any state that seizes the pirate may assert jurisdiction, even though the
act of piracy was not committed within national territory, was not committed
by a national, and was not within any other form of national authority. See
United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 161-62 (1820) (noting that pirate
violates law of nations and is deemed "an enemy of the human race"); 2
MOORE, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 311 (1906). Although the word piracy evokes
images of an ancient crime, piracy still creates problems in some parts of the
world. For example, piracy occurs commonly in the waters off Southeast Asia,
as the plight of the Indochinese refugees demonstrates. J. SWEENEY, C. OLI-
VER & N. LEECH, supra note 73, at 203.
86. Universality authorizes any state that apprehends offenders to exer-
cise jurisdiction over their acts. See, e.g., supra note 85 (discussing piracy).
Thus, the punishing state may lack any connection to the act, for example,
though its territory or through the nationality of the offender or victim. RE-
STATEMENT, supra note 73, § 404 comment a. In the United States, however, a
person cannot be tried in federal courts for an international crime in the ab-
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tions by a foreign business ordinarily would not fit into this cat-
egory.8 7 Finally, the protective principle confers jurisdiction
over foreign acts that threaten national security.8 8
sence of a statute defining and prescribing punishment for the offense. Id re-
porter's note 1. International agreements have recognized certain acts other
than piracy as offenses against universal law. J. SWEENEY, C. OLIVER & N.
LEECH, supra note 73, at 121 (listing acts of violence against diplomats, geno-
cide, hijacking, sabotage of civil aircraft, slave trade, and war crimes). These
agreements must be examined to determine the circumstances allowing juris-
diction over acts other than piracy, and are effective only among signatory na-
tions. Id Thus, the universality principle presumably does not justify
excercising jurisdiction over a national from a nonsignatory nation. Once
these agreements are widely accepted, however, prohibited offenses become
subject to universal jurisdiction under customary international law. See RE-
STATEMENT, supra note 73, reporters note 1. Based on this analysis, the Re-
statement includes within the universality principle the following acts other
than piracy: "slave trade, attacks on or hijacking of aircraft, genocide, war
crimes, and perhaps terrorism." Id. § 404 & comment a.
No consensus has been reached regarding the addition of terrorism to the
roster of crimes within universal jurisdiction. The General Assembly of the
United Nations adopted a resolution against terrorism in 1972. G.A. Res. 3034,
27 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 119, U.N. Doc. A/8730 (1972), reprinted in
[1972] 26 U.N.Y.B. 649-50, U.N. Sales No. E.74.I.1. The United States voted
against the resolution, however, because it lacked concrete enforcement meas-
ures and did not condemn all terroristic acts, but only those of repressive gov-
ernments. 68 DEP'T ST. BULL. 92 (1973) (statement of George Bush, U.S.
Ambassador to the U.N., in general assembly plenary session). Because terror-
ism usually is motivated by political goals, nations sympathetic to those goals
may object to universal jurisdiction over terroristic acts. Terrorism therefore
probably cannot yet be classified as an offense against international law. See J.
SWEENEY, C. OLIVER & N. LEECH, supra note 73, at 121; cf. i fra note 87 (not-
ing proposed RICO reform aimed at increasing RICO's effectiveness against
terrorism).
87. Universal jurisdiction usually corresponds in some way to criminal
law. The Restatement notes, however, that international law does not pre-
clude the use of noncriminal law through universality jurisdiction. RESTATE-
MENT, supra note 73, § 404 comment b. Civil laws such as RICO thus arguably
may provide a remedy in tort or restitution for victims of universally recog-
nized crimes. Authors of proposed RICO reforms have considered just such a
possibility. For example, a provision permitting foreign service of process was
included to "increase the effectiveness of RICO against international terror-
ism." S. REP. No. 459, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1988). But see supra note 86
(discussing questionable status of terrorism as offense under universality
principle).
88. In United States v. Pirzarusso, 388 F.2d 8 (2d Cir.), cerL denied, 392
U.S. 936 (1968), the court upheld jurisdiction over a foreign defendant charged
with making false statements on immigration papers, finding that "a state 'has
jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching legal consequences to conduct
outside its territory that threatens its security as a state or the operation of its
governmental functions."' Id. at 10 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 33 (1965)). The offenses
threatening the security of a state include: espionage; counterfeiting of the
state's seal or currency; falsification of official documents; perjury before con-
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Among these narrowly tailored principles, the territorial
principle furnishes the most likely basis for prescriptive juris-
diction over a foreign defendant in a RICO case. In particular,
courts have expanded the concept of "territory" to encompass
conduct outside national boundaries that has a substantial ef-
fect within such boundaries.8 9 This so-called "effects doc-
trine,"90 which some foreign governments view with hostility,9 '
sular officials; and conspiracy to violate the immigration or customs laws. RE-
STATEMENT, supra note 73, § 402(3) comment f; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)
(1982) (including counterfeiting as predicate act under RICO).
Some courts have expanded the protective principle to encompass any act
that threatens the security of citizens through its potential effects. See, eg.
United States v. Daniszewski, 380 F. Supp. 113 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (relying on na-
tionality principle, but prepared to rely on protective Principle, in finding ju-
risdiction over United States citizen charged with distributing heroin in
Thailand with intent to import it into United States). The Daniszewski court
stated:
There is artificiality of limitation in treating jurisdiction based on the
Protective Principle as confined to those species of conduct abroad
that threaten certain narrowly defined interests in the security of the
enacting state and in the integrity of its governmental operations (e.g.,
visa fraud, counterfeiting) and in excluding those acts abroad which
threaten the peace of the enacting state as that peace lies in the secur-
ity of its citizens from criminal intrusion.
I& at 115-16; see also United States v. Keller, 451 F. Supp. 631, 635 (D.P.R.
1978) (exercising jurisdiction over defendants charged with conspiracy and at-
tempt to import marijuana into United States because "[tihe planned invasion
of the customs territory of the United States is sufficient basis for invocation
of jurisdiction under the protective theory"). But cf. United States v. Rodri-
guez, 182 F. Supp. 479, 488 (S.D. Cal. 1960) (stating that when "the effect is felt
by private persons within the State, penal sanctions rest on the ... territorial
principle," but when "the effect of the acts committed outside the United
States is felt by the government, the protective theory affords the basis [for ju-
risdiction]") (emphasis added), aff'd sub nom. Rocha v. United States, 288 F.2d
545 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 366 U.S. 948 (1961).
89. See, e.g., The S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.) 1927 P.C.T.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at
23 (Sept. 7) ("[Tihe courts of many countries... interpret criminal law in the
sense that offences, the authors of which at the moment of commission are in
the territory of another State, are nevertheless to be regarded as having been
committed in the national territory, if one of the constituent elements of the
offence, and more especially its effects, have taken place there."); United
States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945) (stating that
"it is settled law ... that any state may impose liabilities, even upon persons
not within its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that has consequences
within its borders which the state reprehends"); Regina v. Baxter, [1972] 1
Q.B. 1, 8 (C.A. 1971) (finding jurisdiction over defendant based on effect of
mailing false claims into England from Northern Ireland).
90. The effects doctrine can be illustrated by the classic example in which
a man standing in State X shoots across the border and injures a man in State
Y. The man shooting from State X technically has not committed an act in
State Y because the gun was shot in State X. Under a narrow interpretation of
the territorial principle, State Y does not have jurisdiction. The effects doc-
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is critical to jurisdiction in an extraterritorial RICO case when-
ever the location of an act cannot be fixed precisely. For exam-
trine gives State Y authority to prosecute the man who shot the gun, however,
because his act of injuring the man in State Y has a substantial effect on State
Y. Cf. Simpson v. State, 92 Ga. 41, 42-46,17 S.E. 984, 985-86 (1893) (standing in
South Carolina, defendant shot at victim in Georgia).
At one time, the United States refused to recognize the effects doctrine.
In an early antitrust, case, Justice Holmes, writing for the majority of the
United States Supreme Court, stated:
But the general and almost universal rule is that the character of an
act as lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly by the law of
the country where the act is done .... For another jurisdiction, if it
should happen to lay hold of the actor, to treat him according to its
own notions rather than those of the place where he did the acts, not
only would be unjust, but would be an interference with the authority
of another sovereign, contrary to the comity of nations, which the
other state concerned justly might resent.
American Banana Co. v United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909); see supra
note 38 (discussing American Banana).
Subsequent antitrust cases have undercut Justice Holmes's broad language
in American Banana. Thus, in 1962, the Supreme Court declared that "[a]
conspiracy to monopolize or restrain the domestic or foreign commerce of the
United States is not outside the reach of the Sherman Act just because part of
the conduct complained of occurs in foreign countries." Continental Ore Co. v.
Union Carbide & Carbon Corp, 370 U.S. 690, 704 (1962); see also Timberlane
Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 61314 (9th Cir. 1976) (basing juris-
diction on effects of foreign conduct); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am.,
148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945) (basing jurisdiction on consequences in United
States of conduct committed abroad).
91. Jurisdiction over foreign acts based on effects within a nation's terri-
tory does not always result in controversy. If the offense is an act generally
recognized as criminal, such as a shooting or sending libelous publications
across a national border, most nations concede that the affected nation has ju-
risdiction. See Gotlieb, supra note 12, at 450; sulpra note 61. When the offense
violates an economic law, however, and causes primarily economic effects, as-
serting jurisdiction generates disputes. See Dam, supra note 15, at 891 ("Anti-
trust presents vexing problems of extraterritoriality because it involves
differences in national competition policies, as well as rival national economic
interests."); Davidow, supra note 21, at 502 (stating "there have been five dip-
lomatic protests of U.S. antitrust cases for every instance of express diplomatic
support"); Griffim, supra note 13, at 23 ("Foreign governments respond that in-
ternational law does not recognise the validity of jurisdiction based upon ef-
fects of economic conduct and does not authorise such jurisdictional claims.").
Nevertheless, the effects doctrine remains a viable basis for extraterritorial ju-
risdiction. See supra note 89.
In addition to the effects doctrine, application of the territoriality princi-
ple raises other issues. See RESrATEMENT, supra note 73, § 402 comment c
(identifying controversies). Conflict sometimes arises, for example, when a na-
tion exerts jurisdiction over foreign products or technology because they
originated within domestic territory, as when the United States imposed ex-
port controls on Siberian pipeline equipment and technology originating in the
United States. See supra note 19. These controls required foreign firms to ob-
tain a validated license before exporting any equipment based on technology of
United States origin if use of the data was subject to a licensing agreement or
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ple, by using modem international communications, parties to a
business deal can conduct a transaction by telephone, by telex,
on a computer terminal, or through a combination of these
means. Under the effects doctrine, the site at which a transac-
tion takes place becomes irrelevant to jurisdictional analysis.92
This doctrine would establish prescriptive jurisdiction over
RICO violations committed abroad by foreign defendants when
those violations have a substantial impact in the United
States.9 3
royalty payments to a United States citizen. Zaucha, supra note 19, at 1169.
For a discussion of the resulting conflict, see supra notes 19-20.
92. See, e.g., Chisholm & Co. v. Bank of Jamaica, 643 F. Supp. 1393 (S.D.
Fla. 1986). Faced with the dilemma of determining whether a RICO violation
had taken place in the United States, the Chishzolm court decided that the lo-
cus of the act was unimportant and asserted jurisdiction under the effects doc-
trine. I& at 1401. Because the defendants' acts had "a direct effect in the
United States ... where the acts actually occurred is irrelevant." Id.
93. The effects doctrine has been used to reach securities fraud in extra-
territorial cases. See, eg., Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 991
(2d Cir.) (upholding jurisdiction in a 10b-5 securities fraud case, because "ac-
tion in the United States is not necessary when subject matter jurisdiction is
predicated on a direct effect [in the United States]"), cert denied, 423 U.S. 1018
(1975); see also Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir.) (finding
jurisdiction where securities fraud committed by Canadian defendants created
effects in United States), rev'd on rehearing, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en
bane), cert denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969); Kaufman v. United States, 163 F.2d 404,
411 (6th Cir. 1947) (upholding jurisdiction over mailings of allegedly fraudu-
lent materials posted in Canada that used United States mails and harmed
United States investors); United States v. Van Cauwenbreghe, 827 F.2d 424, 480
(9th Cir.) (upholding jurisdiction over foreign defendants charged with wire
fraud involving telex originating in Switzerland and sent to California), cert
denied, 108 S.Ct. 773 (1987).
In Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976),
the court observed that the effects doctrine takes a limited view of extraterri-
toriality by neglecting to consider the impact of asserting jurisdiction on for-
eign relations. Id. at 611-12. The court therefore proposed a tripartite analysis
that modifies the effects doctrine: first, a court must determine whether an
act caused some effect on American commerce; second, the court must evalu-
ate the effect in view of the antitrust laws to ascertain whether a cognizable
injury exists; finally, the court must compare the nexus between the act and
the United States with the act's relationship to other nations. Id. at 613. The
Timberlane court provided a list of eight factors to consider in balancing
United States interests against foreign claims in the third stage of its analysis.
Id. at 614.
Courts deciding extraterritorial antitrust cases since Timberlane have
adopted its balancing test or some modification thereof. See, e.g., Industrial
Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 671 F.2d 876, 884-85 (5th Cir. 1982), vacated on
other grounds, 460 U.S. 1007, holding reinstated, 704 F.2d 785 (5th Cir.), cert
denied, 464 U.S. 961 (1983); Montreal Trading Ltd. v. Amax Inc., 661 F.2d 864,
869-70 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1001 (1982); Mannington Mills,
Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1297-98 (3d Cir. 1979); see also Calvani
& Schmidt, RICO and the Jurisdictional Rule of Reason: Giving Extraterrito-
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B. JURISDICTION TO ADJUDICATE
Adjudicative jurisdiction refers to a court's authority94 to
r7ia Effect to RICO, 2 Civ. RICO REP. 4 (1987) (suggesting that Timberlane's
balancing analysis could be applied to extraterritorial RICO cases). But see
Laker Airways v. Sabena, 731 F.2d 909, 948-53 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (doubting feasi-
bility and appropriateness of balancing as a judicial function).
Although the Timberlane line of cases concern antitrust law, the RE-
STATEMENT provides a list of factors to be applied in extraterritorial cases gen-
erally. These factors are designed to moderate the effects doctrine and
introduce comity into a court's decision. RESTATEMENT, supra note 73, § 403.
They are:
1. the extent to which the activity occurs within the nation or has
substantial, direct, and foreseeable effects;
2. the nexus between the nation and the persons responsible for the
activity;
3. the character of the activity, the importance of the regulation to
the nation, the extent to which other nations regulate the activity,
and the degree to which the regulation is generally accepted;
4. the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or
damaged by the regulation;
5. the importance of the regulation to the international system;
6. the extent to which the regulation is consistent with international
traditions;
7. the extent to which another nation has an interest in regulating
the activity,
8. the potential for conflict with other nations.
Id. § 403(2).
Some of these factors are particularly important in RICO cases. For ex-
ample, with respect to the third factor, RICO's value to the United States can-
not be overemphasized. See Goldsmith, supra note 64, at 830-38 (discussing
merits of civil RICO); see also supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text
(same). In addition, with respect to the fifth factor, RICO has the potential to
benefit the international system in combating that organized crime which is
not contained by national boundaries. Finally, with reference to the eighth
factor, RICO is directed against acts recognized as criminal by other nations,
making its extraterritorial application less controversial than such application
of economic laws. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
Each of the Restatements general factors could support a court's decision
to exercise jurisdiction in an extraterritorial RICO case. Some factors, how-
ever, might militate against jurisdiction. For example, RICO's treble damage
provision might generate objections from other nations, creating conflict with
those nations. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 73, § 403(2)(8); see, e.g., Cira,
supra note 28, at 264 (noting that "'perhaps the major difficulty experienced
by foreign governments through the extraterritorial enforcement of United
States antitrust laws results from private treble damages actions"' (quoting
Australian Attorney General)); Griffin, Possible Resolution of International
Disputes Over Enforcement of U.S. Antitrust Laws, 18 STAN. J. INT'L L. 279,
280-81 (1982) (noting call of Commonwealth Law Ministers for coordinated
resistance to United States treble damage judgments). But see infra note 158
(discussing importance of treble damages).
94. Establishing that a United States law such as RICO applies prescrip-
tively to a foreign defendant does not assure its applicability in litigation. The
court must be satisfied that a sufficient nexus exists between the foreign de-
fendant and the United States to justify action in a United States forum. See 2
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bind defendants personally95 or to exercise jurisdiction over the
defendant's property located within the territory of the fo-
rum.96 Jurisdiction to adjudicate requires personal jurisdiction,
proper service of process, and appropriate venue.
9 7
1. Personal Jurisdiction
Personal jurisdiction over resident defendants usually
J. MOORE, J. LUCAs, H. FmK & C. THOmpSON, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 1
4.02(3) (2d ed. 1988) (stating that "[w]ithout jurisdiction over the person or the
res, the court cannot render a valid judgment, even if it has subject-matter
jurisdiction").
95. Judicial power over a person, or in personam jurisdiction, is required
in cases involving defendants' personal rights. Therefore, a court lacking juris-
diction over the defendant personally also lacks power to issue a personal
judgment against the defendant. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 711 (5th ed. 1979);
see Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 727 (1877) (stating that in personam jurisdic-
tion exists when "object of action is to determine the personal rights and obli-
gations of the defendants").
96. Quasi in rem jurisdiction .consists of judicial authority over a person's
interest in property located within the forum. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1121
(5th ed. 1979). In Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), the Supreme Court
stated: "The effect of a judgment in [a quasi in rem] case is limited to the
property that supports jurisdiction and does not impose a personal liability on
the property owner, since he is not before the court." Id. at 199. In a footnote,
the Court defined two types of quasi in rem jurisdiction: "In one the plaintiff
is seeking to secure a pre-existing claim in the subject property and to extin-
guish or establish the nonexistence of similar interests of particular persons.
In the other the plaintiff seeks to apply what he concedes to be the property of
the defendant to the satisfaction of a claim against him." Id. at 199 n.17.
When a court bases jurisdiction on property in the forum state, the prop-
erty's presence satisfies constitutional standards of due piocess if the property
is the subject matter of the case. See 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1070 (2d ed. 1987). If the property is not the sub-
ject matter of the suit, however, the same due process analysis that governs in
personam jurisdiction applies. In other words, the presence of property alone
does not support jurisdiction. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 207.
97. Personal jurisdiction, service of process, and venue are related but
separate requirements. Personal jurisdiction requires that a court have juris-
diction over a defendant's person or property. See 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
supra note 96, § 1063. In contrast, service of process notifies a defendant that
his, her, or its rights are to be adjudicated. Grooms v. Greyhound Corp., 287
F.2d 95, 97-98 (6th Cir. 1961) ("The purpose of the summons is to give notice to
the defendant that it has been sued."). Venue, on the other hand, requires
that a case be instituted and decided in the proper location. Securities Investor
Protection Corp. v. Vigman, 764 F.2d 1309, 1313 (9th Cir. 1985) (stating that
venue "relates to the place where judicial authority may be exercised").
All three concepts exist to protect the defendant, yet the defendant may
waive any one of them by making a personal appearance. See Leroy v. Great
W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173,180 (1979) (noting both personal jurisdiction and
venue "are personal privileges of the defendant ... and both may be waived by
the parties"); FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(1).
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arises from their presence in the forum's territory.98 When
United States litigation targets nonresident foreign defendants,
due process9 9 limits personal jurisdiction by requiring that at
least minimum contacts 00 exist between the defendants and
the United States.101 In addition, any exercise of extraterrito-
98. At one tune, presence in the forum state was the sole basis for per-
sonal jurisdiction. The Supreme Court summarized this requirement in Inter-
national Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945): "Historically the
jurisdiction of courts to render judgment in personam is grounded on their de
facto power over the defendant's person. Hence his presence within the terri-
torial jurisdiction of a court was prerequisite to its rendition of a judgment
personally binding him." Id at 316 (citing Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733
(1877)). See generally 4 C. WRIGHT & A. M=LLER, supra note 96, § 1064 (dis-
cussing history of personal jurisdiction).
99. The due process clause of the fifth amendment limits federal court ju-
risdiction, while the fourteenth amendment due process clause limits state
court jurisdiction. Both due process clauses state that a person shall not be de-
prived of "life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST.
amends. V, XIV, § 1. These due process clauses also apply in determining per-
sonal jurisdiction over foreign litigants. See, e.g., Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells
Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406, 416 n.7 (9th Cir. 1977); Weinstein v. Norman
M. Morris Corp., 432 F. Supp. 337, 339 (E.D. Mich. 1977); Japan Gas Lighter
Ass'n v. Ronson Corp., 257 F. Supp. 219, 225 (D.N.J. 1966); see also irifrz note
101 (discussing application of due process clauses to extraterritorial RICO
cases).
100. See International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (asserting that out-of-state de-
fendant must have "certain minimum contacts with [the forum state] such that
the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice"' (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940))).
Minimum contacts requires "some act by which the defendant purposefully
avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum... thus
invoking the benefits and protections of its laws." Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S.
235, 253 (1958) (citing International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319); see, e.g., Calder v.
Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 788-89 (1984) (upholding personal jurisdiction based on ar-
ticle defendants wrote and edited for national magazine circulated in plain-
tiff's resident state); McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223-24
(1957) (upholding personal jurisdiction based on defendant's delivery of con-
tract to forum state, in which insured plaintiff was resident and from which
premiums were paid). Those acts which result in purposeful availment must
be "continuous and systematic" if the cause of action does not arise from the
defendant's contact with the forum, but need only be sporadic if the cause of
action arises directly out of the defendant's contacts with the forum.
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 nn.8-9, 415-16
(1984).
Although Supreme Court cases discussing minimum contacts generally in-
volve domestic defendants, the same standards apply to actions against foreign
defendants. See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court, 107 S. Ct.
1026, 1033-34 (1987) (plurality opinion) (dismissing cases for lack of personal
jurisdiction over Japanese corporation); Helicopteros, 466 U.S. dt 416 (dis-
missing case for lack of personal jurisdiction over Columbian corporation).
101. Under the RICO statute, the defendant need have only some connec-
tion with the United States as a whole, and not with any particular state. FTC
v. Jim Walters Corp., 651 F.2d 251, 256 (5th Cir. 1981) (stating that when na-
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rial jurisdiction must be reasonable and fair.LO2
tionwide service of process is authorized, "due process requires only that a de-
fendant in a federal suit have minimum contacts with the United States"); see,
e.g., FSLIC v. Provo Excelsior Ltd., 664 F. Supp. 1405, 1421-22 (D. Utah 1987);
McIntyre's Mini Computer Sales Group, Inc. v. Creative Synergy Corp., 644 F.
Supp. 580, 585-86 (E.D. Mich. 1986); Hirt v. UM Leasing Co., 614 F. Supp. 1066,
1069-70 (D. Neb. 1985).
A minority of courts, however, seem to require that a RICO defendant
have minimum contacts with a particular state. See, e.g., Caldwell v. Palmetto
State Say. Bank, 811 F.2d 916, 918 (5th Cir. 1987) (dismissing case due to de-
fendant's lack of contact with Texas); Damiani v. Adams, 657 F. Supp. 1409,
1416 (S.D. Cal. 1987) (dismissing case for lack of contact with California).
This split in outcomes stems from application of the fifth amendment's
due process clause to some cases and of the fourteenth amendment's due pro-
cess clause to other cases. See sulpra note 99. When a federal district court ex-
ercises diversity jurisdiction, the fourteenth amendment's due process clause
requires that the defendant have sufficient contacts with the forum state. Se-
curities Investor Protection Corp. v. Vigman, 764 F.2d 1309, 1315 (9th Cir.
1985). When a federal court exercises federal question jurisdiction, and the
statute involved authorizes nationwide service of process, the fifth amend-
ment's due process clause applies and, arguably, the defendant need not have
minimum contacts with any particular state. See Handley v. Indiana & Mich.
Elec. Co., 732 F.2d 1265, 1271 (6th Cir. 1984). Every appellate court to address
the issue of minimum contacts in a federal question case has applied the fifth
amendment and used a national contacts standard. See 4 C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, supra note 96, § 1067.1 n.24. The Supreme Court has not yet resolved
the issue. See Asahi Metal, 107 S. Ct at 1033 (declining to address issue); see
also J. ATwooD & K BREwSTER, supra note 5, § 5.06, at 118 (maintaining that
contacts with national forum is better view); Roddy & Craig, Jurisdiction,
Venue and Service of Process in Civil RICO Actions, 6 RICO L. REP. 387, 390-
93 (1987) (same).
When a RICO case applies a state long-arm statute to assert personal ju-
risdiction, however, a foreign defendant must have contacts with the forum
state. See Omni Capital Int'l v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 108 S. Ct. 404, 409 (1987)
(noting that in absence of statutory provision for service, state long-arm stat-
ute limits federal court jurisdiction); see generally 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
supra note 96, § 1067.1 (stating that most "federal courts have... [rejected]
the national contacts test in long-arm service cases").
102. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court, 107 S. Ct. 1026,
1033-35 (1987) (examining "traditional notions of fair play and substantial jus-
tice" apart from minimum contacts and suggesting balancing test to determine
whether personal jurisdiction is reasonable); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,
471 U.S. 462 (1985). The Burger King Court emphasized that once minimum
contacts have been established, a court should consider whether "jurisdiction
would comport with 'fair play and substantial justice' ". Id at 476; see supra
note 94. The Restatement expressly limits extraterritorial jurisdiction to adju-
dicate by imposing a reasonableness standard: "A state may... exercise juris-
diction to adjudicate with respect to a person or thing, if the relationship of
the person or thing to the state is such as to make the exercise of such juris-
diction reasonable." RESTATEMENT, supra note 73, § 421(1). In deciding what
constitutes fairness and reasonableness, the court may consider whether the
forum has a special interest in granting the plaintiff relief, and may weigh the
relative convenience for the parties and factors associated with the forum non
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Difficulties obtaining personal jurisdiction over foreign de-
fendants are likely to occur in every extraterritorial case. Sev-
eral well established approaches that meet due process
requirements, however, are particularly applicable to extrater-
ritorial RICO cases. The existence of minimum contacts be-
tween a foreign defendant and the United States may be
established not only on the basis of the defendant's own con-
tacts, but also through the presence of a domestic agent for the
defendant. 03 Thus, a domestic subsidiary of a foreign company
may serve as a jurisdictional conduit through which judicial au-
thority over the parent may be obtained. Merely proving the
existence of a parent-subsidiary relationship between two com-
panies does not, however, establish minimum contacts104 The
subsidiary and the parent must be sufficiently close to justify
the exercise of jurisdiction over the parent. 0 5 In one extrater-
conveniens doctrine. See 2 J. MooRE, J. LucAs, H. FINK & C. THOMPSON,
supra note 94, % 4.41-1[4.-1].
103. To establish personal jurisdiction over a defendant based on the pres-
ence of a domestic agent, a plaintiff must show that an agency relationship ex-
ists. The plaintiff therefore must establish that the defendant requested the
agent's performance, was benefited by the agent's domestic activity, and exer-
cised some control over the agent. Como v. Commerce Oil Co., 607 F. Supp.
335, 340 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); cf. Kramer Motors, Inc. v. British Leyland, Ltd., 628
F.2d 1175, 1177 (9th Cir.) (finding personal jurisdiction over British defendants
lacking because importer was not British defendants' agent), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1062 (1980). Once the agency relationship is established, other agency
principles may become relevant. Thus, under the doctrine of ratification, a
foreign defendant may be held responsible for acts committed by the agent
outside of the agency's scope. See, e.g., Dorothy K. Winston & Co. v. Town
Heights Dev., Inc., 376 F. Supp. 1214, 1216 (D.D.C. 1974).
104. Transure, Inc. v. Marsh & McLennan, Inc., 766 F.2d 1297, 1299 (9th
Cir. 1985); see also Escude Cruz v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 619 F.2d 902,
905 (1st Cir. 1980) (holding that even if nonresident parent is sole owner of
resident subsidiary, presumption of corporate separateness must be overcome
to establish jurisdiction over parent); 2 J. MooRE, J. LucAs, H. FIN & C.
THOMPsON, supra note 94, q 4.41-1[6] (discussing parent-subsidiary basis for es-
tablishing minimum contacts).
105. In Bulova Watch Co., Inc. v. K Hattori & Co., Lt&, 508 F. Supp. 1322
(E.D.N.Y. 1981), the court identified two approaches for determining whether
jurisdiction over a foreign parent may be established through its domestic sub-
sidiary. First, an agency relationship may exist between the parent and the
subsidiary; second, the parent may control the subsidiary so completely that,- in
fact, the subsidiary is a mere department of the parent. Id at 1334; see, e.g.,
Coca-Cola Co. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 595 F. Supp. 304, 308 (N.D. Ga. 1983)
(holding that due process and "fair play and substantial justice" do not prevent
jurisdiction over parent that controls subsidiary to extent that it is merely di-
vision or department of parent).
In determining whether a parent and a subsidiary are sufficiently close, a
court may consider the following factors: 1) whether the parent arranges fi-
nancing for and capitalizing of a subsidiary; 2) whether separate books, tax re-
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ritorial RICO case, for example, the court recognized the par-
ent-subsidiary relationship as a basis for jurisdiction, but found
the plaintiff had failed to make the necessary showing of close-
ness between the two.106
Another method of obtaining personal jurisdiction is espe-
cially useful in extraterritorial RICO litigation. The absent co-
conspirator 10 7 theory permits a court to assert jurisdiction over
an absent person based on a co-conspirator's presence in the fo-
rum state.L08 Courts interpret this theory strictly, however.
turns, and financial statements exist; 3) whether the parent and the subsidiary
have separate officers and directors; 4) whether the parent holds out its sub-
sidiary as an agent; 5) the subsidiary's method of paying the parent; and 6) the
extent to which the parent controls the subsidiary's day-to-day affairs. Mid-
west Petroleum Co. v. American Petrofina, Inc., 603 F. Supp 1099, 1112 (E.D.
Mo. 1985); cf. Miller v. Honda Motor Co., 779 F.2d 769 (1st Cir. 1985). In
Honda Motor Co., the court found that no personal jurisdiction existed over a
Japanese parent company because the company and its domestic subsidiary op-
erated with different sets of officers; the parent reimbursed the subsidiary for
warranty repairs and charged interest for delayed payments; and the subsidi-
ary controlled its own advertising, marketing, personnel, financial, and real es-
tate planning. Id at 772-73.
The parent-subsidiary analysis also may work in the converse. That is,
given sufficient closeness, jurisdiction over a foreign subsidiary may be estab-
lished through the presence of a domestic parent. See Rea v. An-Son Corp., 79
F.RID. 25, 32 (D. Okla. 1978) (finding personal jurisdiction over Venezuelan
subsidiary based upon Oklahoma parent's control).
Finally, personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation does not guaran-
tee that jurisdiction exists over its officers and directors. Under the fiduciary
shield doctrine, corporate employees are granted personal immunity for acts
done in their employee capacity. See Gregoris Motors v. Nissan Motor Corp. in
USA, 630 F. Supp. 902, 914 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (holding foreign corporate officers
not individually subject to personal jurisdiction for acts done as employees);
Idaho Potato Comm'n v. Washington Potato Comm'n, 410 F. Supp. 171, 180,
181 (D. Idaho 1975) (holding exercise of personal jurisdiction over employees
based on contacts between employer and forum state would contravene "fair
play" and "substantial justice"); see also Nordic Bank PLC v. Trend Group,
Ltd., 619 F. Supp. 542, 570 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (finding that fiduciary shield doc-
trine protected individual defendants in extraterritorial RICO case); infra
note 109 (addressing fiduciary shield doctrine in co-conspirator context).
106. Huang v. Sentinel Gov't Sec., 657 F. Supp. 485, 489-90 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)
(noting plaintiffs could not demonstrate "'degree of domination and control
necessary"' to base jurisdiction over parent or acts of its subsidiary); see also
Soltex Polymer Corp. v. Fortex Indus., Inc., 590 F. Supp. 1453, 1462 (E.D.N.Y.
1984) (discussing application of Bulova Watch standards to RICO counterclaim
against foreign defendants), aff'd, 832 F.2d 1325 (2d Cir. 1987).
107. RICO prohibits any conspiracy to violate the act. See' 18 U.S.C.
§ 1962(d) (1982).
108. See, ag., Bonavire v. Wampler, 779 F.2d 1011, 1014 (4th Cir. 1985)
(finding jurisdiction over defendants involved in fraudulent scheme but never
present in forum state based on presence of one individual in state); Dixon v.
Mack, 507 F. Supp. 345, 349-52 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (finding that jurisdiction over
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Jurisdiction must be supported by "specific facts that, if proven,
would demonstrate the defendant's membership in the
conspiracy."' 09
Finally, some courts have suggested that minimum contacts
could be established by showing that a foreign defendant's acts
had a foreseeable impact on the United States-a sort of "ef-
fects doctrine"n of personal jurisdiction."' Supreme Court
rulings in this area, however, remain unclear. For example, the
Court expressly rejected this standard for personal jurisdiction
in an interstate child custody dispute,1 2 but later relied on it in
an interstate libel case as one element supporting jurisdic-
tion.1-3 In the area of prescriptive jurisdiction, the effects test
nonresident defendant in civil rights action charging conspiracy did not violate
due process).
109. See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Fedders Corp., 643 F.2d 1229, 1237 (6th Cir.)
(finding unsupported allegations of conspiracy did not establish personal juris-
diction over Spanish corporation), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 893 (1981); see aso
Solter, 590 F. Supp. at 1457 (finding no personal jurisdiction over foreign RICO
defendants under co-conspirator theory). The Soltez court also noted that, had
there been a prima fade showing of conspiracy, -jurisdiction still would have
failed based on the fiduciary shield doctrine. Id. The court stated that Second
Circuit cases "'have recognized that if an individual has contact with a particu-
lar state only by virtue of his acts as a fiduciary of the corporation, he may be
shielded from the exercise by that state of jurisdiction over him personally on
the basis of that conduct."' Id (quoting Marine Midland Bank, N.A. v. Miller,
664 F.2d 899, 902 (2d Cir. 1981)); see also supra note 105 (discussing fiduciary
shield doctrine in parent-subsidiary context).
110. See supra notes 89-93 and accompanying text.
111. See, e.g., Gilbert v. DaGrossa, 756 F.2d 1455, 1459 (9th Cir. 1985) (recog-
nizing that "effects doctrine" may serve as basis for personal jurisdiction);
Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1267 n.5 (5th Cir. 1978) (up-
holding personal jurisdiction over Idaho officials where application of Idaho
statute to Texas corporation caused corporation to alter business practices,
thereby having direct effect in Texas), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Leroy
v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979); Leasco Data Process Equip.
Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1340-41 (2d Cir. 1972) (holding effects doctrine
relevant to in personam jurisdiction over foreign defendants); Hudson v.
Moore Business Forms, Inc., 609 F. Supp. 467, 476 (D.C. Cal. 1985) (upholding
personal jurisdiction in breach of employment contract case based on effects of
defendant's wrongful conduct); see also Reingold v. Deloitte Haskins & Sells,
599 F. Supp. 1241, 1255 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (limiting personal jurisdiction based on
effects to instances in which defendant knows or has good reason to know con-
duct will have effects in the forum). The Restatement also endorses the use of
effects to establish jurisdiction over the parties. RESTATEMENT, supra note 73,
§ 421(2)(j) (stating that jurisdiction is reasonable if "the person ... carried on
outside the state an activity having a substantial, direct or foreseeable effect
within the state, which created liability, but only in respect of such activity").
112. Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 96-98 (1978) (limiting effects as
basis for personal jurisdiction to cases involving wrongful activity causing in-
jury in state).
113. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789-90 (1984) (finding that defendants
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focuses on acts of an absent defendant that have a foreseeable
effect in the forum state-' 4 In the area of personal jurisdiction,
however, due process requires that "being haled into court""15
in a particular state be foreseeable. Foreseeable effects thus
may not be sufficient 16 to establish personal jurisdiction unless
they encompass foreseeable litigation.1 7
engaged in tortious activity outside forum state knowing it would have an ef-
fect in that state).
114. See, ag., ANTITRUST Div., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANiTrRUST GumE
FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS (1977). According to the Antitrust Guide:
"When foreign transactions have a substantial and foreseeable effect on U.S.
commerce, they are subject to U.S. law regardless of where they take place."
Id at 6 (emphasis added).
115. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
116. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court, 107 S. Ct. 1026,
1033-35 (1987). In Asahi, a plurality of the Court appeared to reject mere fore-
seeability as a standard satisfying due process. Instead, the plurality required
that the defendant's contact with the forum state "come about by an action by
the defendant purposefuly directed toward the forum State." Id. at 1033 (em-
phasis in original); see also World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 297 (re-
jecting foreseeability as sole basis for personal jurisdiction in product liability
case when consumer introduced product into forum state); Domnel's Hotel,
Inc. v. East West Helicopter, Inc., 580 F. Supp. 15, 18 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (finding
defendant sellers' knowledge that product would be used in forum state insuf-
ficient contact to support personal jurisdiction). But see First Am. First, Inc. v.
National Ass'n of Bank Women, 802 F.2d 1511, 1571 (4th Cir. 1986) (upholding
personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendant who should have known that
allegedly defamatory letter would inflict greatest harm in forum state); Dono-
van v. Grim Hotel Co., 747 F.2d 966, 974 (5th Cir.) (subjecting defendant to
personal jurisdiction based on foreseeable consequence in forum state), cert
denied, 471 U.S. 1124 (1984).
117. In World-Wide Volkswagen, the Court announced:
[T]he foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis is not the
mere likelihood that a product will find its way into the forum state.
Rather, it is that the defendant's conduct and connection with the fo-
rum state are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled
into court there.
444 U.S. at 297. In Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985), the
Court stressed that foreseeability of litigation, not foreseeability of causing in-
jury in another state, was the key inquiry for personal jurisdiction. Id. at 474;
see also Leab v. Streit, 584 F. Supp. 748, 757 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (holding that
basing personal jurisdiction on foreseeability of occurrences in forum state is
improper, but court may consider foreseeability of suit in forum).
In an extraterritorial RICO case, the court suggested that even if the ef-
fect of the defendant's acts included the foreseeability of litigation, the court
also must find that the claim arose out of these acts. See Huang v. Sentinel
Gov't Sec., 657 F. Supp. 485, 490-91 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (finding defendant had not
purposefully availed itself of privilege of conducting activities in forum and
stating in dicta that even if it had, jurisdiction would fail because plaintiffs had
not shown "causal nexus between defendant's acts and their claims"). If the
defendant's acts in Huang were sporadic, as it appears, then special jurisdic-
tion requirements control and the court correctly required that the claim arise
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2. Service of Process
Adjudicative jurisdiction in an extraterritorial RICO case
also requires valid service of process."18 While personal juris-
diction requirements protect defendants' constitutional
rights," 9 service of process constitutes the "physical means by
out of the acts. See supra note 100. If the defendant's acts had been continu-
ous and systematic, however, then under Helicoteos Nacionales dce CoZo,
S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 nn.8-9, 415-16 (1984), a nexus between the acts
and the claims should not have been required. See supra note 100. As with
the effects doctrine in prescriptive jurisdiction, establishing personal jurisdic-
tion based on the foreseeable effect a foreign defendant creates could be lim-
ited or modified by a balancing approach. See supra note 93 (discussing
blancing factors in case law and Restatement). The Supreme Court advocated
this approach in Asahi. After a plurality of the Court discussed defendant's
lack of minimum contacts, eight justices agreed that the reasonableness of per-
sonal jurisdiction depended on an evaluation of several factors. 107 S. Ct. at
1033. The Court described this balancing process:
A court must consider the burden on the defendant, the interests of
the forum state, and the plaintiff's interest in obtaining relief. It also
must weigh in its determination "the interstate judicial system's inter-
est in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies; and the
shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental sub-
stantive social policies."
Id- at 1034 (citation omitted). In the case of a foreign defendant, the Court
noted that the "unique burdens" of "defending oneself in a foreign legal sys-
tem should have significant weight in assessing the reasonableness" of per-
sonal jurisdiction. IM. The Court also recognized, however, that when
minimum contacts exist, "often the interests of the plaintiff and the forum in
the exercise of jurisdiction will justify even the serious burdens placed on the
alien defendant." Id
118. See Robertson v. Railroad Labor Bd., 268 U.S. 619, 622 (1925) (holding
valid service necessary for personal jurisdiction in absence of defendant's vol-
untary appearance); Jackson v. Hayakawa, 682 F.2d 1344, 1347 (9th Cir. 1982)
(same); Royal Lace Paper Works, Inc. v. Pest-Guard Prods., Inc., 240 F.2d 814,
816 (5th Cir. 1957) (finding federal court lacks jurisdiction absent service of
process under either United States or state statutes).
Note, however, that a party may waive the right to proper service of pro-
cess. See supra note 97. By so doing, a defendant submits voluntarily to the
jurisdiction of a court. See Alger v. Hayes, 452 F.2d 841, 842-43 (8th Cir. 1972)
(finding right to proper service waived when defendant failed to allege defect
in service in his answer, never filed a written motion regarding improper ser-
vice, and proceeded to try case).
In addition, a defendant may consent to service of process by methods
other than those provided for by rule or by statute. For example, parties to a
contract may provide in its terms for consent to service of process. See Na-
tional Equip. Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 315-16 (1964) (affirming right to
determine service of process by contract but noting that consent may not be
upheld under all circumstances); AAMCO Automatic Transmissions, Inc. v.
Hagenbarth, 296 F. Supp. 1142, 1143 (E.D. Pa. 1968) (involving franchise agree-
ment that contained consent to jurisdiction in Pennsylvania and service by
registered mail to last known address of licensee).
119. In particular, due process requires that service of process notify the
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which... jurisdiction is asserted."'20
Service of process on foreign defendants may be difficult.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure describe methods of ser-
vice in foreign countries,121 but do not independently authorize
foreign service of process. Such authorization must be con-
ferred by state or federal statute,122 which RICO does not do.123
Nevertheless, a RICO plaintiff may obtain service on a foreign
defendant in three ways: by properly serving the foreign de-
fendant in the United States;2 4 by using a state long-arm stat-
ute;2 5 or by relying on an independent claim for which a
statute authorizes foreign service ofprocess.'2 6
defendant of the proceeding and thereby provide an opportunity to be heard.
See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950). The
Mullane Court stated that "an elementary and fundamental requirement of
due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reason-
ably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of
the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their ob-
jections." Id. at 314. See generally 2 J. MooRE, J. LuCAS, H. FINK & C. THOMP-
SON, supra note 94, 11 4.02[3].
120. DeMelo v. Toche Marine, Inc., 711 F.2d 1260, 1264 (5th Cir. 1983); see
also 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 96, § 1063 (asserting that primary
function of service of process is to bring notice of action's commencement to
defendant's attention and to "provide a ritual that marks" court's assertion of
jurisdiction over lawsuit).
121. See FED R. Civ. P. 4(i).
122. l. Rule 4 prescribes the manner of service in a foreign country for
cases in which "the federal or state law referred to in subdivision (e) ... au-
thorizes service upon a party not an inhabitant of or found within the state in
which the district court is held, and service is to be effected upon the party in
a foreign country." Id. (emjphasis added). Thus, rule 4(i) provides only for ser-
vice that is authorized by a statute referred to in rule 4(e), including United
States statutes and statutes of the state in which a district court is located. I&
4(e). For examples of service on foreign defendants authorized by state stat-
ute, see United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 379 U.S. 378, 381 (1965) (finding
state long-arm statute authorized service on Uruguayan corporation); Raffaele
v. Compagnie Generale Maritime, 707 F.2d 395, 396-98 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding
German corporation amenable to service through Oregon long-arm statute).
For examples of such service authorized by federal statute, see Alco Standard
Corp. v. Benalal, 345 F. Supp. 14, 26-27 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (finding service on
Spanish corporation authorized by federal securities law); United States v.
Glaxo Group Ltd., 302 F. Supp. 1, 3 (D.D.C. 1969) (finding foreign service of
process authorized by federal statute providing for civil actions in cases of pat-
ent interference), rev'd on other grounds, 410 U.S. 52 (1973).
123. See Nordic Bank PLC v. Trend Group, Ltd., 619 F. Supp. 542, 564
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (finding RICO does not, "by its very language, authorize ser-
vice in a foreign country"' (quoting Lopez v. Richards, 594 F. Supp. 488, 493
(S.D. Miss. 1984))); Soltex Polymer Corp. v. Fortex Indus., 590 F. Supp. 1453,
1460 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (same), affd, 832 F.2d 1325 (2d Cir. 1987).
124. See infra notes 127-38 and accompanying text.
125. See infra notes 139-43 and accompanying text.
126. See infra notes 144-47 and accompanying text.
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Service of process in the United States may be accom-
plished by serving the defendant personally, by serving a
United States agent of the foreign business, or, under RICO, by
properly serving one defendant in the United States and
thereby acquiring the right to serve all others in the same case
by showing that the ends of justice so require. Personal service
requires the defendant's presence in the forum country.127
Thus, a foreign defendant residing abroad must enter the
United States, temporarily at least 2s , in order for service be
achieved.129
In addition, if a foreign defendant having contact with the
United States has designated an agent for the service of process
in the United States,130 service on the agent effectively serves
the foreign defendant.' 3 ' Service through agency also may be
127. See supra note 98 and accompanying text; see also 4A C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, supra note 96, § 1095 (noting "[t]he usual and most desirable method
of service is by personal delivery of a copy of the summons and complaint to
defendant within the state").
128. See, e.g., Leab v. Streit, 584 F. Supp. 748, 755-56 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (find-
ing temporary or transitory presence in forum state bestows jurisdiction upon
courts); Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442, 447 (E.D. Ark. 1959) (approving
service on airplane flying over Arkansas).
129. See, ag., Amusement Equip., Inc. v. Mordelt, 779 F.2d 264, 270 (5th Cir.
1985) (concluding that "when the defendant is present within the forum state,
notice of the suit through proper service of process is all the process to which
he is due"). But cf. Fisher, Brown & Co. v. Fielding, 67 Conn. 91, 125, 34 A.
71i4, 729 (1895) (noting transient jurisdiction offers "premiums to scavengers of
sham and stale claims at every center of travel"); 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
supra note 96, §§ 1064 n.15, 1073 n.20 (noting widespread criticism of rule pro-
viding for transient jurisdiction).
130. Designation may be made by contract, see supra note 118, or by opera-
tion of law, see Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623, 628 (1935) (upholding
Iowa statute containing implied consent provision for service by office manag-
ers involved in securities sales); Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356-57 (1927)
(upholding Massachusetts statute that deemed state official as service of pro-
cess agent for nonresident motorists using state highways and noting that
some method for notice to defendant of service existed). Some state statutes
generally require that foreign corporations doing business in the state desig-
nate an agent for service of process. 4A C. WRIGHT & A. MILER, supra note
96, § 1116; see, ag., Randolph Labs., Inc. v. Specialties Dev. Corp., 62 F. Supp.
897, 899 (D.N.J. 1945) (upholding service on agent required to be designated by
New Jersey law). Federal statute also may authorize an agent to accept ser-
vice of process. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1694 (1982) ("In a patent infringement ac-
tion commenced in a district where the defendant is not a resident but has a
regular and established place of business, service of process ... upon such de-
fendant may be made upon his agent or agents conducting such business.").
131. If the defendant is an individual, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure rule
4(d)(1) applies, prescribing that service be made '%y delivering a copy of the
summons and of the complaint to an agent authorized by appointment or by
law to receive service of process." FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(1). The rule has been
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made on a United States subsidiary of a foreign parent corpora-
tion,13 - or on the representative of a foreign business, if the rep-
resentative is so "integrated with the corporation sued as to
make it likely that he will realize his responsibilities and know
what he should do with any legal papers served on him."'133
Finally, RICO section 1965(b)134 authorizes service of pro-
cess on defendants residing in other districts when one defend-
ant otherwise has been properly served. 35 Thus, in some
circumstances, this section provides for service of process on de-
interpreted to require actual appointment of the agent to accept service. See,
ag., Mlichelson v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 619 F. Supp.
727, 742 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (finding service of defendant's law firm ineffective be-
cause no member of firm was authorized to accept service on defendant's be-
half); Gipson v. Township of Bass River, 82 F.R.D. 122, 125 (D.N.J. 1979)
(finding township clerk not authorized to receive service for members of town-
ship zoning board of adjustment).
If the defendant is a corporation, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure rule
4(d)(3) applies, prescribing that service on a foreign corporation be made "by
delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to an officer, a manag-
ing or general agent, or to any other agent authorized by appointment or by
law to receive service of process." FED. R. CIV. P. 4(d)(3); see, ag., Heise v.
Olympus Optical Co., 11 F.R.D. 1, 6 (N.D. Ind. 1986) (upholding service on
president of Japanese company's United States subsidiary); American Can Co.
v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 433 F. Supp. 333, 337 (E.D. Wis. 1977) (upholding
service on managing agent of corporation).
132. See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
133. C. WIGHTrr, LAw OF FEDERAL CouRTs § 64 (4th ed. 1983). Because the
representative acts as an agent for the foreign defendant, agency principles ap-
ply. See supra note 103 and accompanying text; see also Montclair Elecs., Inc.
v. Electra/Midland Corp., 326 F. Supp. 839, 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (stating agent
served should know what to do with papers); Van Hoven Co. v. Stans, 319 F.
Supp. 180, 182 (D. Minn. 1970) (stating service on "a responsible person [de-
clared] to be in charge" is sufficient).
134. Section 1965(b) states:
In any action under section 1964 [civil remedies] of this chapter in any
district court of the United States in which it is shown that the ends
of justice require that other parties residing in any other district be
brought before the court, the court may cause such parties to be sum-
moned, and process for that purpose may be served in any judicial dis-
trict of the United States by the marshal thereof.
18 U.S.C. § 1965(b) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
135. RICO's legislative history and the application of § 1965(b) indicate
congressional intent in drafting this provision to provide for nationwide ser-
vice of process in certain circumstances. Congress planned for RICO to be a
tool in the eradication of organized crime. See supra note 31 and accompany-
ing text. Nationwide service of process avoids "jurisdictional gaps" that would
be created if no single court could assert jurisdiction over all of the defendants
in a RICO conspiracy case. "[Merely naming persons in a RICO complaint,"
however, "does not, in itself, make them subject to Section 1965(b)'s nation-
wide service provisions." Butcher's Union Local No. 498 v. SDC Inv., Inc., 788
F.2d 535, 539 (9th Cir. 1986) (noting that plaintiffs may sue separately nonresi-
dent defendants who did not participate in single racketeering enterprise).
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fendants not within the court's territorial boundaries. Specifi-
cally, in a case in which at least one of multiple RICO
defendants is properly before the court, the "ends of justice
may require that other parties... be brought before the court
... as well."'136  This provision can be used to centralize an ac-
tion by requiring defendants located in various districts to ap-
pear before a single federal court.' Although sound policy
arguably favors its application to foreign defendants, the statu-
tory text does not encompass such situations and the case law is
divided. 38
Because rule 4(i) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
allows foreign service of process if authorized by state law,L39
direct service on nonresident foreign defendants in extraterri-
torial RICO cases may be accomplished through state long-arm
statutes. 40 The long-arm statute must, of course, comport with
136. See supra note 134. The "ends of justice" so require if venue is laid
properly as to one defendant and no other district exists in which venue would
be appropriate as to all defendants. See, ag., Butcher's Union, 788 F.2d at 539;
Miller Brewing Co. v. Landau, 616 F. Supp. 1285,1290 (E.D. Wis. 1985); Soltex
Polymer Corp. v. Fortex Indus., Inc., 590 F. Supp. 1453, 1459 (E.D.N.Y. 1984),
affi'd, 832 F.2d 1325 (2d Cir. 1987).
137. See, eg., Butcher's Union, 788 F.2d at 539; Miller Brewing, 616 F. Supp.
at 1290.
138. See Soltex Polymer, 590 F. Supp. at 1460 (rejecting use of § 1965(b) for
foreign service of process and noting RICO contains no language authorizing
foreign service of process). But see Shulton, No. 85-2925 (using § 1965(b) to as-
sume jurisdiction over RICO defendants from Panama and Guatemala).
The section's language must be the starting point in any analysis of
whether it extends service to foreign countries. The statute specifically states
that once personal jurisdiction has been obtained over one defendant, "other
parties residing in any other district [may] be brought before the court." 18
U.S.C. § 1965(b) (1982) (emphasis added). "District" may imply an area within
the United States; thus, based on the statutory language alone, it does not ap-
pear that § 1965(b) contemplates service in a foreign country. Courts have sug-
gested, however, that Congress created § 1965(b) as a vehicle for filling
jurisdictional gaps. See supra note 135. Although no statutory or congres-
sional evidence exists for extending § 1965(b) to foreign defendants such an
extension would fill gaps created when those defendants have minimum con-
tacts with the United States but cannot be served because no federal oi state
statute authorizes process.
139. See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(i); see also supra note 122 (providing statutory
language and examples of cases authorizing service of process under state
law).
140. Plaintiffs in federal district court usually rely on state long-arm stat-
utes when jurisdiction is based on 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1982) (authorizing federal
diversity jurisdiction). A state long-arm statute also may be available in cases
in which jurisdiction is based solely on a federal question under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1331 (1982). See United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 379 U.S. 378, 381
(1965) (upholding service on Uruguayan corporation under state long-arm stat-
ute in federal question case); 4A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 96,
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due process requirements.1 4 ' The statute also must contem-
plate reaching the defendants-that is, the statutory language
must support extraterritorial scope.14 Using such state long-
arm statutes to reach defendants in foreign countries furthers
the purposes underlying RICO.' 4
3
A statute authorizing foreign service of process for an in-
dependent accompanying claim also may provide for foreign
service in a RICO case. 4 4 In other words, service of process
§ 1115. Thus, in extraterritorial RICO cases relying on either diversity juris-
diction or on federal question jurisdiction through RICO itself, a state long-
arm statute may be used for service of process.
141. See supra notes 99-102 and accompanying text (discussing due process
requirements of minimum contacts and of fair play and substantial justice); see
also supra note 119 (discussing due process requirement of notice and opportu-
nity to be heard).
142. See, e.g., CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 1973) ("A court of this
state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitu-
tion of this state or of the United States."); see also In re All Terrain Vehicles
Litig., No. 88-237 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 23, 1989) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist. file)
(holding that Japanese RICO defendants could be served under both Califor-
nia and Pennsylvania long-arm statutes). In Nordic Bank PLC v. Trend
Group, Ltd., 619 F. Supp. 542 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), the court concluded that the
more limiting language of New York's long-arm statute did not reach the con-
duct of the foreign RICO defendants. Id at 567-69. That statute provided for
"personal jurisdiction over any nondomiciliary... who in person or through
an agent: 1. transacts any business within the state; or 2. commits a tortious
act within the state... ; or 3. commits a tortious act without the state causing
injury... within the state." Id at 566 (quoting N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R.
§ 302(a) (McKinney 1972)). The court agreed with the plaintiffs that the de-
fendants had transacted business in the state, but recognized .that the statute
required that the claim arise out of those business acts, a requirement that the
plaintiffs' claim did not meet. Id at 567. The plaintiffs in Nordic Bank argued
that the defendants' fraudulent tortious activity outside the state had caused
injury in New York, but the court held that the plaintiffs failed to establish a
prima facie case of fraud. Id. at 568; see also Michelson v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 709 F. Supp. 1270, 1284 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (holding that
plaintiff failed to establish that New Mexico long-arm statute reached foreign
RICO defendants in this case).
143. See North Carolina v. Alexander & Alexander Servs., 680 F. Supp. 746
(E.D.N.C.), cert~fcation for immediate appeal denied, 685 F. Supp. 114
(E.D.N.C. 1988). In Alexander, the court used North Carolina's long-arm stat-
ute to uphold personal jurisdiction and service of process over two British de-
fendants. Id at 751. The court reviewed RICO's liberal process provision and
stated that "allowing a federal court to use state long-arm jurisdiction... is
the only logically consistent interpretation of the RICO statute." Id. at 749-50;
see also supra note 135 and accompanying text (noting § 1965(b) of RICO was
intended to fill jurisdictional gaps); cf. Butcher's Union v. SDC Inv., Inc., 788
F.2d 535, 539 (9th Cir. 1986) (noting provision for nationwide service of process
was intended to liberalize process requirements to "bring all members of a na-
tionwide RICO conspiracy before a court in a single trial").
144. The following federal statutes explicitly authorize foreign service of
process: 8 U.S.C. § 1451(b) (1982) (rev6cation of naturalization); id §§ 146, 293
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under a non-RICO count in a complaint may encompass all
other claims within the same cause of action, including RICO
claims.145 For example, courts have interpreted section 27 of
the Securities Act of 1934 as authorizing foreign service of pro-
cess.146 Thus, when a complaint alleges RICO and securities vi-
olations, foreign service of process for all violations may be
accomplished through the securities law provision.147
3. Venue
Proper venue is the final element of jurisdiction to adjudi-
cate. 48 Venue concerns the appropriate location of a lawsuit.149
(patents). Courts have held that the following statutes implicitly authorize
foreign service of process: 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1982) (antitrust); 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 77v(a), 78aa, 79(y) (West 1981 & Supp. 1988) (securities); 28 U.S.C. § 1655
(1982) (liens affecting real property). Note that some courts, however, main-
tain that statute's special venue requirements must be satisfied as a prerequi-
site to extraterritorial service of process. See, e.g., Michelson, N.Y. 1989)
(discussing authority for and against venue as limitation and concluding that
antitrust venue requirements restrict extraterritorial service of process in anti-
trust case).
145. Service of process acts.as the vehicle for providing the defendant with
notice and is the physical means by which a court asserts jurisdiction. See
supra note 119. Delivery of a complaint accomplishes that for all included
counts regardless of which count authorizes service. Allowing a RICO count
to ride along with a claim under a separate statute that authorizes service in a
foreign country also furthers judicial economy and convenience to the parties,
and recognizes the federal policy against piecemeal litigation. Cf. Cooper v.
North Jersey Trust Co., 226 F. Supp. 972, 981-82 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (upholding
service under Securities Exchange Act for accompanying state claims involv-
ing same rights); 6 C. WRIGHT & A. AILER, .supra note 96, § 1588 (discussing
pendent personal jurisdiction in joinder of claims).
146. See, eg., Travis v. Anthes Imperial LtcL, 473 F.2d 515, 529 (8th Cir.
1973); Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1340 (2d
Cir. 1972); Ferraioli v. Cantor, 259 F. Supp. 842, 847 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
147. See Chamarac Properties, N.V. v. Pike, No. 86-Civ.-7919 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.
19, 1988) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file). In Chamarac, the court refused to
dismiss the RICO count for improper service of process. IA Noting that the
defendant had been served properly in Hong Kong under accompanying secur-
ities claims, the court declared: "To dismiss the RICO counts as [the defend-
ant] urges defies logic. The goal of service of process is to ensure that
defendants are sufficiently and timely apprised of the charges against them."
I Because the defendant clearly was notified of the RICO claim in the pa-
pers served "he clearly suffers no prejudice." Ia The Chamarac court also
emphasized that because it previously had approved the securities law claims,
the plaintiff obviously did not "bootstrap" the securities claim to effect foreign
service of the RICO claim. Id
148. 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 96, § 1063 (noting that "all four
requirements [subject matter jurisdiction, venue, jurisdiction over the person,
and service of process] must be satisfied in every case"). Note that a court
without proper venue over the case may proceed, however, if the defendant
does not make a proper and timely objection. 28 U.S.C. § 1406(b) (1982)
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RICO contains a special venue provision 50 that supplements
the general federal venue statute,1 51 section 1391 of title 28.152
Because the general venue statute provides that "[a]n alien may
be sued in any district,"' 53 however, courts may establish
proper venue over foreign defendants without resort to RICO's
("Nothing in this chapter shall impair the jurisdiction of a district court of any
matter involving a party who does not interpose timely and sufficient objec-
tion to the venue."); see, eg., Hoiness v. United States, 335 U.S. 297, 301-02
(1948).
A motion to dismiss for improper venue usually results in transfer of the
case to another district rather than in dismissal. See 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (1982)
(providing for dismissal or "if it be in the interest of justice, transfer ... to any
district or division in which [the case] could have been brought"); see, e.g., Sin-
clair v. Kleindienst, 711 F.2d 291, 294 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (reversing district court's
dismissal because transfer would not prejudice defendant's position on merits
and dismissal would result in barring of action under statute of limitations).
149. In distinguishing venue from subject matter jurisdiction, Justice
Frankfurter stated.
The jurisdiction of the federal courts .. . is a grant of authority to
them by Congress and thus beyond the scope of litigants to confer.
But the locality of a lawsuit-the place where judicial authority may
be exercised-though defined by legislation relates to the convenience
of litigants and as such is subject to their disposition.
Neirbo Co v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165, 167-68 (1939); see
also Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Vigman, 764 F.2d 1309, 1313 (9th
Cir. 1985) ("[J]urisdiction is the power to adjudicate, while venue, which re-
lates to the place where judicial authority may be exercised, is intended for
the convenience of the litigants." (quoting Still v. Rossville Crushed Stone Co.,
370 F.2d 324, 325 (6th Cir. 1966) (per curiam), cert denied, 387 U.S. 918 (1967)))
(emphasis in original).
150. 18 U.S.C. § 1965(a) (1982) states: "Any civil action or proceeding
under this chapter against any person may be instituted in the district court of
the United States for any district in which such person resides, is found, has
an agent, or transacts his affairs."
151. See, eg., Miller Brewing Co. v. Landau, 616 F. Supp. 1285, 1291 (E.D.
Wis. 1985) (noting "venue provisions of § 1965 ... are supplemental to those
found in 28 U.S.C. § 1391"); So-Comm, Inc. v. Reynolds, 607 F. Supp. 663, 665-
66 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (stating venue for RICO claim may be based on either provi-
sion); Sunray Enters. v. David C. Bouza & Assocs., Inc., 606 F. Supp. 116, 119
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) (same); Eaby v. Richmond, 561 F. Supp. 131, 139 (E.D. Pa.
1983) (same); Medical Emergency Serv. Assocs. v. Duplis, 558 F. Supp 1312,
1314 n.3 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (noting courts have held that RICO provision supple-
ments general venue provision).
152. 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (1982).
153. IcL § 1391(d). The Supreme Court has defined an alien as a person
born outside the United States who has not been naturalized under the Consti-
tution and cannot claim citizenship in any other manner. Low Wah Suey v.
Backus, 225 U.S. 460, 473 (1912). Section 1391(d) also encompasses corpora-
tions. Brunette Mach. Works, Ltd. v. Kockum Indus., 406 U.S. 706, 714 (1972);
Ohio Reinsurance Corp. v. British Nat'l Ins. Co., 587 F. Supp. 710, 711




special venue provision.'- 4
C. JURISDICTION TO ENFORCE
While prescriptive jurisdiction focuses on the offense al-
leged by a plaintiff and adjudicative jurisdiction focuses on the
parties involved, enforcement jurisdiction is a court's power to
execute its orders and judgments,155 and is necessary to con-
clude a RICO case meaningfully.'5 6
154. The Supreme Court noted that "Section 1391(d) is properly regarded,
not as a venue restriction at all, but rather as a declaration of the long-estab-
lished rule that suits against aliens are wholly outside the operation of all the
federal venue laws, general and special." Brunette Mach., 406 U.S. at 714. The
statutory language has been interpreted literally and an alien now can be sued
in any district. See, e.g., Oil & Gas Ventures-First 1958 Fund, Ltd. v. Kung,
250 F. Supp. 744, 749-50 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (rejecting former "district of service of
process" limitation on § 1391(d)); see also General Elec. Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie
Co., 550 F. Supp. 1037, 1039 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (holding venue under § 1391(d) ap-
plies in antitrust action); RCA Records v. Hanks, 548 F. Supp. 979, 982 (D.D.C.
1982) (holding alien defendants who were not agencies or instrumentalities of
foreign nation can be sued in any district); Transatlantic Cement, Inc. v. Lam-
bert Freres et Cie, 448 F. Supp. 816, 819 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (holding alien defend-
ants can be sued in any district for breach of contract and tortious interference
with contractual relations). Therefore, in a case involving both foreign and do-
mestic defendants, suit is proper in any district in which the domestic defend-
ants may be sued. See, e.g., Japan Gas Lighter Assoc. v. Ronson Corp., 257 F.
Supp. 219, 225 (D.N.J. 1966); Maryland ex rel Mitchell v. Capital Airlines, 199
F. Supp. 335, 337 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
155. For example, enforcement jurisdiction is needed to obtain discovery.
Under United States law, a court may order a party within its jurisdiction to
produce all relevant documents owned or controlled, wherever located. Marc
Rich & Co. v. United States, 707 F.2d 663, 667 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 463 U.S.
1215 (1983); United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 396 F.2d 897, 900-01 (2d Cir.
1968); Federal Maritime Comm'n v. DeSmedt, 366 F.2d 464, 468-69 (2d Cir.)
(dicta), cert denied, 385 U.S. 974 (1966).
156. Once a court issues a judgment against a foreign defendant, the judg-
ment may be impossible to execute unless the court has enforcement jurisdic-
tion. See 4A C. WRIGHT & A. MLLER, supra note 96, § 1133 (noting difficulty
of enforcing judgment in foreign countries).
Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir.
1984), illustrates the problems that can arise without enforcement jurisdiction.
Laker Airways brought an antitrust suit against its competitors in a United
States district court, charging predatory price fixing. I&i at 915, 917. In re-
sponse, several defendants filed for antisuit injunctions in a British court to
prevent Laker from continuing its treble damage suit against them. Id at 918.
During the antisuit proceedings, the British Secretary of State for Trade and
Industry directed the Laker defendants not to comply with any discovery or-
ders or judgment issued by the United States court. Id. at 920. The British
Court of Appeals affirmed the Secretary's order and, in reversing a lower
court denial, enjoined Laker from continuing its antitrust suit. British Air-
ways Bd. v. Laker Airways, [1984] Q.B. 142, 202-03 (CA. 1983), rev'd, [1985]
App. Cas. 58 (1984). Meanwhile, Laker filed in the United States court for an
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
Prescriptive and adjudicative jurisdiction are prerequisites
to enforcement jurisdiction.157 In addition, any enforcement
measures must be both related to the laws or regulations at is-
sue and proportional to the seriousness of the violations in-
volved.158  Finally, enforcement jurisdiction may not violate
injunction to stop the British antisuit, which the district court granted and the
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 915-16.
Had the case ended at this point, enforcement jurisdiction would have been
critical, for without it, Laker could not obtain relief in a United States court.
In the latest episode of this case, however, the House of Lords vacated the
British court's injunction against Laker's United States suit. British Airways
Bd. v. Laker Airways, [1985] App. Cas. 58, 96 (1984). Because British law con-
tains no cause of action encompassing Laker's complaint, the House of Lords
reasoned, the merits of the case must be decided in a United States court. I.
at 79-80 (opinion of Lord Diplock). To escape suit, the defendants therefore
would have to show that they were entitled under English lws not to be sued
in the United States action. See id. at 80; see also Aldisert, supra note 78, at
416-18 (discussing Laker Airways case).
157. See, e.g., Arret Fornage, 84 Journal du Palais 229 (Cass. crim. Fr.
1873), reprinted in J. SWEENEY, C. OLIVER & N. LEECH, supra note 73, at 123
("ITihis jurisdiction, however broad it may be, cannot extend to crimes com-
mitted outside the territory by aliens who, in respect to those acts are not pun-
ishable in French courts."). But cf Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 723 (1877)
(stating in dicta that court with subject matter and personal jurisdiction may
compel transfer of property located outside court's territorial reach). The Re-
statement provides:
(1) A state may employ judicial or nonjudicial measure to induce or
compel compliance or punish noncompliance with its laws or regula-
tions, provided those laws or regulations are based on jurisdiction to
prescribe ....
(2) Enforcement measures may be employed against persons located
outside the territory of the enforcing state only if-
(c) when enforcement is through the courts, if the state has jurisdic-
tion to adjudicate.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 73, § 431(1), (2)(c).
In one sense, however, a court need not have either prescriptive or adjudi-
cative jurisdiction to exercise enforcement jurisdiction. A court lacking these
aspects of jurisdiction may enforce a valid judgment entered by another court
that did have jukisdiction to prescribe and adjudicate.
158. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 73, § 431(3) ("Enforcement measures
must be reasonably related to the laws or regulations to which they are di-
rected, and punishment for noncompliance must be proportional to the gravity
of the violation."). The comments to § 431 emphasize that this provision em-
bodies a requirement of reasonableness. Id- comments d, f. Professor F.A.
Mann characterized "reasonableness" as the master principle of jurisdiction in
international law. Meessen, International Law Limitations on State Jurisdic-
tion, in EXTRA-TERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF LAWS AND RESPONSES THERETO
41 (C. Olmstead ed. 1984). However, reasonableness defies easy definition. In
the conflict of laws context, reasonableness encompasses public policy and con-
stitutional standards. Id In the international setting, nations rarely agree on
a common standard of public policy, and constitutional standards differ. Id
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another nation's sovereignty.15 9
Because no extraterritorial RICO case has yet resulted in
judgment against a foreign defendant, 60 enforcement issues
have not yet arisen in this context. Extraterritorial enforce-
ment under other federal laws, however, provides insight into
the potential difficulties of RICO enforcement. 161 This experi-
Professor Meessen therefore suggests that extraterritorial jurisdiction should
be legal under international law so long as it is "not unreasonable." I.
The Restatement gives examples of enforcement measures not in propor-
tion to the violation. Thus, lying on an application for a visa reasonably may
result in denial of the visa or deportation, but would not justify seizure of as-
sets; failure to disclose material information on a stock prospectus reasonably
may result in delisting of the stock or enjoining its sale, but would not justify
seizure of assets or denial of export privileges. RESTATEMENT, suprz note 73,
§ 431 comment f. Proportionality raises concerns about RICO's treble damages
provision, 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), which has provoked considerable criticism and
unsuccessful attempts at reform. See supra note 64; see also Goldsmith, supra
note 64, at 837, 871-72, appendix (proposing reform of § 1964(a)). Much of this
criticism, however, ignores the seriousness of organized criminality. See id. at
833 & n.31. Furthermore, the Supreme Court recently recognized that
although RICO treble damages deter criminal activity, their primary purpose
is to compensate the victim. See Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMa-
hon, 107 S. Ct. 2332, 2345 (1987). Finally, few RICO plaintiffs would undertake
the expense and uncertainties of extraterritorial litigation if the damages did
not exceed the costs. See J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, supra note 5, § 16.09
(discussing importance of and need for private attorneys-general inherent in
antitrust multiple damages provision). The State Department summed up the
value of treble damages in the antitrust context:
The private treble damage adtion is a crucial aspect of U.S. antitrust
enforcement. It was adopted as a complement to governmental en-
forcement tools, in recognition of the limited resources available to
governmental agencies to investigate and take action against all viola-
tions of the law. It acts as a deterrent to illegal activity in the same
manner as governmental enforcement, and provides an incentive to
the victims to act as "private attorneys-general."
Note No. 56 of the United States Embassy, London (Nov. 9, 1979), quoted in J.
ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, supra note 5, § 1418.
159. See, e.g., Service of Summons in Criminal Proceedings Case, 38 I.L.R.
133 (Aus. Sup. Ct. 1969) ( "[A] summons in criminal proceedings can be served
abroad only in accordance with the procedure laid down in treaties between
Austria and the foreign country concerned."); RESTATEMENT, supra note 73,
§ 432(2) (providing for enforcement in another state only after authorized offi-
cials give consent); L BROWNLIE, supra note 76, at 306-07 ("(A] state cannot
take measures on the territory of another state by way of enforcement of na-
tional laws without the consent of the latter.").
160. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
161. Court orders directed at foreign defendants have included injunctions
against acts that violate United States antitrust laws, see Timken Roller Bear-
ing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 600 (1951), overruled on other grounds,
Copperweld Corp v. Independence Tube Corp, 467 U.S. 752 (1984); orders re-
quiring divestiture of stockholding in foreign corporations, see United States v.
National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319, 328 n.4, 335 (1947); orders requiring the trans-
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ence demonstrates that enforcement jurisdiction is most prob-
lematic when it threatens another nation's sovereignty. 162
Nations perceiving United States extraterritorial jurisdiction as
a threat have taken measures to defeat enforcement of judg-
ment and discovery orders.163 Such measures usually are ac-
compished through statutes that block enforcement of foreign
laws, regulations, or court orders. 64 At least sixteen nations,
including the United Kingdom and Australia, have enacted leg-
fer of foreign patent and trademark rights, see United States v. Imperial
Chem. Indus., 105 F. Supp. 215, 222 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); orders requiring reason-
able efforts to promote sale and distribution of products in foreign countries,
see United States v. Holphane Co., 119 F. Supp. 114, 119 (S.D. Ohio 1954), aff'd,
352 U.S. 903 (1956); and orders instructing foreign defendants to amend an
agreement made in a foreign country, see United States v. Watchmakers of
Switz. Information Centre, Civil No. 96-170 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 1, 1965) (LEXIS,
Genfed library, Dist file). See generally Griffin, supra note 13, at 25 (enumer-
ating types of orders issued by United States courts to redress violations of do-
mestic law).
162. The Canadian ambassador to the United States characterized extrater-
ritorial enforcement as "intrusions into another's domestic affairs and as a
challenge going to the heart of its notion of sovereignty." Gotlieb, supra note
12, at 452. In connection with In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 617 F.2d 1248
(7th Cir. 1980), the United States Department of Justice sent letters rogatory
to British courts, not only to aid discovery in the civil case, but also for pur-
poses of a criminal investigation. The British House of Lords, in deciding that
the letters rogatory should not be enforced, explained that "the sovereignty of
this country had been prejudiced" by the reach of United States law. In re
Westinghouse Uranium Contract, [1978] App. Cas. 547, 630 (1977) (opinion of
Viscount Dithorne); see also Schellenberg, The Proceedings Against Two
French Customs Officials in Switzerland for Prohibited Acts in Favor of a
Foreign State, Economic Intelligence Service and Violation of the Banking
Law, 9 INT'L Bus. LAw. 139, 139-40 (1981) (discussing Swiss convictions of two
French Customs officials). Schellenberg notes that the two French officials
had entered Swiss territory and interrogated a former Swiss bank official
about French citizens hiding taxable funds in Swiss banks. Id. at 139. The of-
ficials were charged with and convicted of violating Swiss banking and eco-
nomic intelligence laws. Id.
163. Examples of legislation designed to defeat enforcement include: Act
No. 254 of 8 June 1967, Limitation of Danish Shipowners' Freedom to Give In-
formation to Authorities of Foreign Countries (Den.); Law Prohibiting a Ship-
owner in Certain Cases to Produce Documents, 4 Jan. 1968 (Finland); Shipping
Documents Act of 1980 (Italy); and Evidence Amendment Act of 1980 (N.Z.).
The texts of these laws are reprinted in A. LOWE, supra note 24, at 114-15, 120-
21, 124-27. In addition to legislative action, foreign nations fighting extraterri-
torial enforcement may resort to diplomatic protests, threats of economic or
political retaliation, judicial noncooperation, and retaliatory action. See gener-
ally Comment, supra note 15, at 503-12 (discussing foreign response to extra-
territorial application of United States law).
164. See generally J. ATWooD & K. BREWSTER, supra note 5, § 4.17-18 (dis-
cussing foreign legislation to block United States laws); 1 W. FUGATE, supra
note 6, §§ 2.16, 3.11 (same); Cira, supra note 28, at 248-60 (same).
1070 [Vol. 73:1023
islation of this type.165
Of special concern are the so-called "claw-back" provisions
found in some blocking statutes, which authorize recovery of
some or all multiple damages enforced in judgments in a for-
eign nation.166 The British statute,167 for example, precludes
enforcement of certain multiple damages judgments in Great
Britain1 68 and permits recoupment of the "'punitive"'16 9 portion
of an enforced judgment through countersuit.170 The Canadian
165. A. LOWE, supra note 24, at 79-97, 100-13, 138-93. Other nations enact-
ing legislation aimed at blocking enforcement include: Belgium, Denmark,
Finland, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Philippines, South Africa, Sweden, and Switzerland. Id at
98-99, 114, 115, 116-17, 118-19, 120, 123, 124-27, 128, 129-31, 132-33, 134, 135-37.
In addition, the United States has considered legislation to block extraterrito-
rial enforcement of foreign laws. The Protection of Confidential Business In-
formation Act of 1981, proposed to the Senate in 1981, would prohibit United
States companies from responding to certain foreign requests for documents.
S. 1592, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4 (1981), reprinted in A. LOWS, suprra note 24, at
194-96.
166. Nations enacting clawback provisions claim that such measures are
merely defensive tactics to protect national sovereignty from intrusions by
United States private damages suits. See Joelson, supra note 35, at 1126; see
generally Cira, supra note 28, (discussing events giving rise to blocking and
claw-back statutes).
167. Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch. 11. Aware of British in-
tent to pass the statute, the United States urged that it not be enacted. The
United States argued that it would "encourage a confrontational rather than
cooperative approach to resolving issues in which both our countries are inter-
ested." Note No. 56 of the U.S. Embassy, London (Nov. 9, 1979), quoted in J.
ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, supra note 5, § 4.18. The British responded that co-
operation "so far had only limited success." Note No. 225 of the U.K. Embassy,
Washington, D.C. (Nov. 27,1979), quoted in J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, supra
note 5, § 4.18.
168. The Protection of Trading Interests Act § 5 states in part "5.-(1) A
(multiple damages] judgment to which this section applies shall not be regis-
tered.., and no court in the United Kingdom shall entertain proceedings at
common law for the recovery of any sum payable under such a judgment."
Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch. 11, § 5.
169. See Amicus Curiae Brief of Gov't of U.K. of Gr. Brit. & N. Ir., at 8
n.11, In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 617 F.2d 1248 (2d Cir. 1980), cited in Joel-
son, supra note 35, at 1122 (noting multiple damages are considered penal in
United Kingdom); Comment, supra note 15, at 508 n.113 (noting that in British
view multiple damages are awardable only in proceedings protected by crimi-
nal trial guarantees). But cf. Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon,
107 S. Ct 2332, 2345 (1987) (stating United States view that RICO and antitrust
treble damages are primarily compensatory).
170. See Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch.11, § 6. The Act states
in part-
6.-(1) This section applies where a court of an overseas country has
given a judgment for multiple damages ... against- (a) a citizen of
the United Kingdom and Colonies; or
(b) a body corporate incorporated in the United Kingdom or a terri-
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claw-back provision reaches even further by allowing for com-
plete recovery of multiple damages judgments in antitrust
suits.17± Such foreign blocking measures may pose severe en-
forcement problems for treble damages judgments under
RICO.
Blocking statutes also may thwart discovery in extraterri-
torial RICO cases.172 The French blocking statute, for example,
makes it illegal for a foreign person even to request discovery
from a French company.173  Because discovery is critical to
tory outside the United Kingdom for whose international relations
Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom are responsible; or
(c) a person carrying on business in the United Kingdom ... and an
amount on account of the damages has been paid...
(2) Subject to [two exceptions], the qualifying defendant shall be enti-
tled to recover from the party in whose favour the judgment was
given so much of the amount ... as exceeds the part attributable to
compensation ....Id.
171. Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act, ch. 49 (1985), cited in J.
ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, supra note 5, § 4.18 (Supp. 1985).
172. The United States investigation into the international shipping indus-
try, specifically the Montshilp litigation, Montship Lines, Ltd. v. Federal Mari-
time Bd., 295 F.2d 147 (D.C. Cir. 1961), provoked a rash of foreign statutes
directed at impeding United States discovery. See, eg., Act No. 3 of 16 June
1967, Authorizing the King-in-Council to Prohibit Shipowners to Transmit In-
formation etc. to Authorities of Foreign Countries, NORSK LORTIDEND 437-38
(Nor.); His Majesty's Ordinance Regarding Prohibition in Certain Cases for
Shipowners to Produce Documents Concerning the Swedish Shipping Indus-
try, No. 156 of 13 May 1966, SVENSK FOR FATrNINGSSAMLING FOR 19661
(Swed.); Law on Federal Duties in Matters Concerning Shipping, 24 May 1965,
and Decree No. 711 of 14 December 1966, on the Transmission of Shipping
Documents to Foreign Authorities, BGBL.II 833 (W. Ger.). Translations of the
texts of these laws are printed in A. LOWE, supra note 24, at 118-19, 128, 134.
Nations threatened by extraterritorial discovery may enact blocking legislation
before the first request for documents arrives. Thus, New Zealand introduced
and enacted blocking legislation in a 24-hour period after discovery negotia-
tions with the United States Justice Department deteriorated. J. ATWOOD &
K. BREWSTER, supra note 5, § 4.17.
173. Commercial Documents Act, 1968-80, J.O. 1799 (Fr.), translation,
printed in A. LOWE, supra note 24, at 116-17. Section 1 of the Act states:
Subject to any international treaties or agreements and to any stat-
utes or statutory instruments in force, it is forbidden for any person
to request, to seek or to communicate, in writing, orally or in any
other manner documents or information of an economic, commercial,
industrial, financial or technical nature to be used as evidence in for-
eign judical or- administrative proceedings or within the context
thereof.
a § 1.
Section 3 provides penalties:
Without prejudice to any more severe penalties which may be laid
down by statute, an infringement.., of this Act shall be punishable
by imprisonment for at least two and not more than six months and
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most commercial litigation, such statutes have generated con-
siderable controversy and may defeat an extraterritorial action
before the court renders a judgment. 7 4
Some enforcement problems can be solved through domes-
tic judicial action. A court with jurisdiction over defiant for-
eign defendants may impose any sanction listed in rule 37 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,175 including assessing rea-
sonable expenses, issuing a contempt order, striking pleadings
and defenses, and entering a default judgment.17 6
The effectiveness of such sanctions, however, remains lim-
ited. In particular, judicial sanctions cannot compete with for-
eign laws forbidding defendants from submitting to United
States discovery.1 7 Moreover, because a foreign defendant al-
ready faces treble damages under RICO, an order to pay costs is
by a fine of at least 10,000 and not more than 120,000 francs or by
either such imprisonment or such fine.
Ia § 3. Foreign persons seeking discovery information in France must use the
government of France as an intermediary rather than approaching private in-
dividuals directly. Note from the French Embassy to the U.S. Dep't of State
Regarding the FTC Investigation of Compagnie de Saint-Gobain-Pont-A-Mous-
son, re2printed in in FTC v. Compagnie de Saint-Gobain-Pont-A-Mfousson, 636
F.2d 1300, 1306 n.18 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
174. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 73, § 437 reporters note 1 ("No aspect
of the extension of the American legal system beyond the territorial frontier
of the United States has given rise to so much friction as the request for docu-
ments ... ."); see also I W. FUGATE, supra note 6, § 3.11 (noting extraterritorial
discovery has generated considerable friction); Davidow, supra note 21, at 509
(noting extraterritorial discovery has caused "many jurisdictional and diplo-
matic difficulties"); Griffin, supra note 13, at 24 (noting extraterritorial discov-
ery has resulted in more protests than "effects" doctrine).
175. FED. R. Civ. P. 37 governs the sanctions a United States court may im-
pose for a party's failure to make or cooperate in discovery.
176. Id; see, eg., Insurance Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de
Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 709 (1982) (holding personal jurisdiction defense waived
as sanction for foreign defendants' failure to produce documents relating to ju-
risdiction); In re Marc Rich & Co., 707 F.2d 663, 670 (2d Cir. 1983) (upholding
fine of $50,000 per day as civil contempt sanction after foreign defendant failed
to produce documents relating to tax evasion investigation), cert denied, 463
U.S. 1215 (1983). In addition, the court may make designated findings of fact
adverse to the defendant, FED. IR CIrv. P. 37(b)(2)(A), and prohibit the intro-
duction of evidence, FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(B). See, e.g., Higginbotham v.
Volkswage4werk Aktiengesellschaft, 551 F. Supp. 977, 979, 983 (M.D. Pa. 1982)
(precluding introduction of expert evidence after plaintiff failed to comply
with discovery order).
177. See, ag, British Airways Bd. v. Laker Airways, [1984] Q.B. 142, 202-03
(C.A. 1983), rev'd, [1985] App. Cas. 58 (1984) (using Protection of Trading Act
to order defendants not to comply with any discovery orders or judgment is-
sued by United States court); see also supra notes 172-74 and accompanying
text (discussing foreign laws barring discovery).
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unlikely to induce compliance with discovery orders. 178 Default
judgments also have limited utility, because a court may not
impose such a judgment absent "willfulness, bad faith, or any
fault."179 Furthermore, once a court enters a default judgment,
the enforcement problem remains. 80 Resolving this issue may
require administrative and executive action.' 8 '
178. In Marc Rich & Co., some documents unearthed during a government
iniiestigation of the company allegedly proved the existence of a $100 million
tax fraud scheme. Marc Rich & Co., 707 F.2d at 665. When the defendant re-
peatedly refused to produce additional documents, the district court ordered
the defendant to pay $50,000 per day until production, limited to 18 months.
In re Marc Rich & Co., 739 F.2d 834, 835 (2d Cir. 1984); see also In re Grand
Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 731 F.2d 1032, 1035 n.1 (2d Cir. 1984) (noting
company had paid $7,950,000 in fines rather than comply with courts' orders).
179. Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerci-
ales, S.A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 212 (1958); see also Wilson v. Volkswagen of
Am., Inc., 561 F. 2d 494, 503 (4th Cir.) (holding sanction for default should be
imposed only in rare cases involving flagrant bad faith and callous disregard of
parties' obligations), cert denied, 434 U.S. 1020 (1977); Independent Prods.
Corp. v. Loew's Inc., 283 F.2d 730, 733 (2d Cir. 1960) ("The dismissal of an ac-
tion with prejudice or the entry of a judgment by default are drastic remedies,
and should be applied only in extreme circumstances."); cf. In re Oil Spill by
Amoco Cadiz, 93 F.R.D. 840, 842-43 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (holding dismissal unwar-
ranted because French law prohibited disclosure of information so that refusal
to provide documents was not willful or in bad faith).
180. Enforcing a judgment against a foreign defendant often will require
either its recognition by the nation holding the defendant's assets or the pres-
ence of assets in the United States. See 4A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra
note 96, § 1133. Enforcing a RICO judgment therefore may prove to be impos-
sible in countries with statutes blocking multiple damages awards. Cf. supra
notes 166-71 and accompanying text (discussing blocking statutes). Moreover,
under the claw-back provisions, even if the foreign defendant has holdings in
the United States, it may be able to recoup the value of any assets executed
upon domestically. Id.
181. Unlike judicial measures, administrative and executive actions do not
require adjudicative jurisdiction. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 73, ch. 3 intro-
ductory note. Thus, even without personal jurisdiction or service of process,
the United States government may take any of the following measures against
RICO violaters: 1) deny or terminate export or import rights; 2) remove the
defendant from a list of those eligible to bid on government contracts; 3) deny
or terminate a permit or license to engage in a particular business activity; and
4) freeze the defendant's United States assets. I& § 431 comment c.
Enforcement also can be approached through diplomacy, with the United
States and the foreign government negotiating over an injured person's rights.
Enforcement measures also may be the subject of multilateral treaties. See,
e.g, Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Docu-
ments, Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361, T.I.A.S. No. 6638, 658 U.N.T.S. 163; Con-
vention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters,
Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 7444, 847 U.N.T.S. 231; Convention
Abolishing Requirement of Legislation for Foreign Public Documents, Oct. 5,
1961, T.I. A.S. No. 10072, 527 U.N.T.S. 189.
Administrative and executive actions, however, also have certain disad-
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Ultimately, jurisdiction to enforce may prove the most seri-
ous barrier to extraterritorial RICO suits. Legislative reform,
however, at least partially could resolve this issue and other
procedural obstacles to extraterritorial RICO jurisdiction.
IlI. EXTRATERRITORIAL RICO REFORM
RICO reform has maintained a place on the congressional
agenda since the Supreme Court's decision in Sedima, S.P.RL.
v. Imrex Co.182 That opinion suggested that remedial legislation
would better solve problems associated with RICO than would
judicial attempts to rewrite the statute. 8 3 Reform efforts have
focused primarily on substantive changes, but two bills have ad-
dressed extraterritorial procedural concerns. The Senate and
the House both have considered proposals to extend RICO's
summons and subpoena provisions to reach parties and wit-
nesses outside the United States.'84 This change, although
helpful, does not address fully the problems of extraterritorial
RICO litigation. Sponsors of both bills cite the need for RICO
to reach foreign defendants,18 5 but neither bill considers other
vantages. For example, the government may choose not to become involved in
private litigation. In one case, the court requested the United States govern-
ment to submit its views on the issues, but the government refused. Interna-
tional Ass'n of Machinists v. Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries,
477 F. Supp. 553, 557-58, 560 (C.D. Cal. 1979), aff'd, 649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir.
1981), cert denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982). In addition, administrative and execu-
tive measures often involve much more than the issues in a particular case.
Once the government does enter into an enforcement action against a foreign
defendant, foreign policy concerns probably will take precedence over the
plaintiff's interests.
182. 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
183. Id at 499-500 (noting RICO's breadth is "inherent in the statute as
written, and its correction must lie with Congress"). The Court stated: "It is
not for the judiciary to eliminate the private action in situations where Con-
gress has provided it simply because plaintiffs are not taking advantage of it in
its more difficult applications.... ." Id
184. See S. 1523, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. § 5 (1988); H.R. 2983,100th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 4(c), 133 CONG. REC. E3356 (daily ed. Aug. 7, 1987). Both bills would
amend 18 U.S.C. § 1965 by:
(1) striking out "residing in any other district;" (subsection (b));
(2) striking out "in any judicial district of the United States by the
marshal thereof." and inserting "anywhere the party may be found."
(subsection (b));
(3) striking out "in any other judicial district" and inserting "any-
where the witness is found" (subsection (c));
(4) striking out "in another district" (subsection (c)); and
(5) striking out "in any judicial district in which" and inserting
"where" (subsection (d)).
185. The report accompanying S. 1523 states that the proposed change
"broadens the scope of RICO by providing for international service of process
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changes that would help to reach foreign defendants located
abroad.
For example, extraterritorial litigation depends on three
types of jurisdiction, each of which poses potential obstacles to
litigation. 8 6 Although legislation cannot address many of these
barriers, 8 7 amendments to RICO can correct some problems
associated with each type of jurisdiction. Providing express leg-
islative recognition of the effects doctrine may facilitate pre-
scriptive jurisdiction.188 Adopting a broader service of process
provision can reduce problems of. adjudicative jurisdiction.18 9
Finally, limiting the treble damages provision cazi reduce the
controversy accompanying enforcement jurisdiction. 9 0
Addressing these needs and drawing on the application of
other United States statutes extended abroad,19' extraterrito-
rial RICO reform should authorize: 1) prescriptive jurisdiction
in extraterritorial cases based on effects; 2) foreign service of
process; 3) designation of domestic agents for service of process;
and 4) reduction of treble damages at a plaintiff's request to fa-
cilitate enforcement jurisdiction. Such reform would rectify
the most pressing difficulties associated with extraterritorial
litigation. The proposed amendments and accompanying com-
mentary are set forth below.
for both parties and witnesses" and that the revision's purpose is "to increase
the effectiveness of RICO against international terrorism." S. REP. No. 459,
100th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1988). The section-by-section analysis of H.R. 2983
also declares that the proposed amendment extends "RICO's service of process
provision for summons and subopena [sic] to parties and witnesses who are
outside the United Sates." 133 CoNG. REc. E3359 (daily ed. Aug. 7, 1987)(statement of Rep. Conyers). The revision intends to "remedy the defect iden-
tified in [RICO extraterritorial cases dismissed for lack of foreign service of
process]." Id-
186. See supra Part H.
187. For example, legislation cannot dispense with many of the problems
and limitations inherent in enforcement jurisdiction. Because enforcing court
orders and judgments abroad depends to a certain degree upon the cooperation
of foreign governments, United States legislative solutions are limited. In ad-
dition, some adjudicative jurisdiction requirements, such as due process and
minimum contacts, are constitutionally constrained and cannot be removed
legislatively.
188. See infra Part I1I(A); cf. supra notes 89-93 and accompanying text
(describing effects doctrine).
189. See infra Part IH(B)-(C); cf. supra notes 118-44 and accompanying
text (discussing service of process).
190. See infra Part III(D); cf supra notes 163-68 and accompanying text
(discussing foreign statutes designed to thwart multiple damages awards).
191. See supra note 39 (discussing extraterritorial application of other
United States laws).
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A. AUTHORIZING RICO APPLICATION BASED UPON EFFECTS
The Congressional Statement of Findings and Purpose for
chapter 96 of title 18, United States Code, last paragraph should
be amended to read as follows:
It is the purpose of this Act [see Short Title note above] to seek
the eradication of organized crime in the United States, and the effect
offoreign organized crime in the United States, by strengthening the
legal tools in the evidence-gathering process, by establishing new pe-
nal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced sanctions and new reme-
dies to deal with the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized
crime.
Section 1962 should be amended by adding subsection (e),
which reads as follows: This chapter applies to prohibited con-
duct that occurs to a substantial extent within the United
States. This chapter also applies to prohibited conduct that oc-
curs outside the United States but causes a substantial domestic
effect as a direct and reasonably foreseeable result of the
conduct.
COMMENTARY
Lacking clear statutory guidance, courts faced with extra-
territorial RICO suits have relied on principles derived from in-
ternational law to establish prescriptive jurisdiction. 92 This
amendment makes clear that RICO does embrace conduct oc-
curring outside the United States and uses the territorial prin-
ciple and the effects doctrine as bases for jurisdiction,
recognizing their successful application and acceptance under
other federal laws. 93
B. AUTHORIZING FOREIGN SERVICE OF PROCESS
Section 1965 of title 18, United States Code, should be
amended to read, in part, as follows:
192. See Republic of Phil. v. Marcos, 818 F.2d 1473, 1478-79, 1489-90 (9th
Cir. 1987) (using territorial principle to base jurisdiction on acts occurring
partly in United States); FMC Corp. v. Varonos, No. 87 C9640 (N.D. III. Oct. 20,
1988) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (same); Chisholm & Co. v. Bank of
Jamaica, 643 F. Supp. 1393, 1401 (S.D. Fla. 1986) (using territorial principle to
base jurisdiction on conduct elsewhere that produced effects in United States).
For a description of the bases of prescriptive jurisdiction, see supra notes 73-93
and accompanying text.
193. For example, cases grounded on the territorial principle and the ef-
fects doctrine have been brought under the federal securities laws, see supra
note 93; antitrust laws, see supra note 90; and mail and wire fraud statutes, see
supra note 93. In addition, the territorial principle ana effects doctrine garner
support from the Restatement. Restatement, supra note 73, § 402.
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(b) In any action under section 1964 of this chapter in any district
court of the United States in which it is shown that the ends of justice
require that other parties be brought before the court, the court may
cause such parties to be summoned, and process for that purpose may
be served wherever the party may be found.
(c) In any civil or criminal action or proceeding instituted by the
United States under this chapter in the district court of the United
States for any judicial district, subpenas [sic] issued by such court to
compel the attendance of witnesses may be served wherever the wit-
ness is found, except that in any civil action or proceeding no such
subpena [sic] shall be issued for service upon any individual who re-
sides at a place more than one hundred miles from the place at which
such court is held without approval given by a judge of such court
upon a showing of good cause.
(d) All other process in any action or proceeding under this chap-
ter may be served on any person wherever such person resides, is
found, has an agent or transacts his affairs.
COMMENTARY
This amendment provides for foreign service of process,
without which the presciptive jurisdiction established by the
foregoing amendment cannot be maintained. 94 Thus, for ex-
ample, although only a handful of extraterritorial RICO cases
have been brought, several have been dismissed for failure to
serve foreign defendants. 9 5 The proposed amendment mirrors
the language of H.R. 2983 and S. 1523,-96 and is derived from
the service of process provisions of federal securities' 97 and an-
titrust laws. 98 Although these statutes only implicitly author-
ize foreign service of process, courts unanimously have upheld
194. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
195. See Michelson v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 709 F. Supp.
1270, 1290 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (denying jurisdiction over foreign defendants be-
cause foreign service of process lacking); Nordic Bank PLC v. Trend Group,
Ltd., 619 F. Supp. 542, 564 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (same); Soltex Polymer Corp. v.
Fortex Indus., 590 F. Supp. 1453, 1460 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (same), qff'd, 832 F.2d
1325 (2d Cir. 1987).
196. See supra note 184.
197. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 27, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78aa (West.
Supp. 1988) (emphasis added) ("Any suit or action to enforce any liability or
duty created by this chapter ... may be brought in any such district... and
process in such cases may be served in any other district of which the defend-
ant is an inhabitant or wherever the defendant may be found.); see also H.R.
2983, 133 CONG. REc. E3359 (Daily ed. Aug. 7, 1987) (statement of Rep. Cony-
ers) (stating that proposed RICO change authorizing foreign service of process
"reflects current securities law").
198. Clayton Act § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1982) (providing that in "[a]ny suit,
action, or proceeding under the antitrust laws against a corporation... all pro-
cess... may be served in the district of which [the corporation] is an inhabit-
ant, or wherever it may be found").
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this application 99 and the intent here is to continue this
practice.
C. SPECIFYING AN AGENT FOR SERVICE OF PROCESS
Section 1965(d) of title 18, United States Code, is amended
by inserting after the last sentence the following text: "Wizen
the defendant is not a resident of the United States but has a
regular and established place of business therein, service of pro-
cess, summons, or subpoena may be made on the defendant's
agent or agents conducting such business."
COMMENTARY
Although service of process through an agent ordinarily
may not be accomplished unless the principal has authorized
the agent to accept such service,200 federal statutes may vest an
existing agent with authority to accept service of process on the
defendant. 20 ' The proposed amendment therefore parallels the
language of 28 U.S.C. § 1694 (1982), which permits service in
patent infringement actions on agents of foreign defendants
that maintain a place of business in the United States.20 2 The
provision expressly confers on agents conducting a defendant's
business authority to accept service, whether or not the defend-
ant already has given such authorization.
D. AUTHORIZING REDUCTION OF TREBLE DAMAGES ON THE
PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST
Section 1964(c) of title 18, United States Code, should be
amended by inserting after the last sentence the following text:
"Successful claimants under section 1964 may request a reduc-
tion of treble damages to facilitate extraterritorial
enforcement."
199. For examples of cases authorizing foreign service of process under the
antitrust laws, see Chrysler Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 589 F. Supp. 1182,
1206 (D.D.C. 1984); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus., 402 F. Supp.
262, 329-30 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Hoffman Motors Corp. v. Alfa Romeo S.p.A., 244 F.
Supp. 70, 79-80 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). See also J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, supra
note 5, § 5.16 (discussing foreign service of process in antitrust cases). For a
discussion of cases authorizing foreign service of process under federal securi-
ties laws, see supra note 146.
200. See supra notes 127-28 and accomplanying text.
201. See, e.g., 43 U.S.C. § 1062 (Supp. IV 1986) (authorizing any agent in
control of enclosed land to accept service for defendant in suits alleging unlaw-
ful enclosure).
202. See supra note 130 (providing text of 28 U.S.C. § 1694 (1982)).
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This amendment recognizes the value of treble damages,
yet also acknowledges that a judgment unenforced does not
benefit the plaintiff. The proposed amendment therefore al-
lows successful claimants discretion to reduce the treble por-
tion and thereby increase the liklihood of collecting judgment.
Conclusion
Chief Justice John Marshall once declared:
It is most true that this Court will not take jurisdiction if it should
not: but it is equally true, that it must take jurisdiction if it
should .... We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdic-
tion which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or
the other would be treason to the constitution. 20 3
Once domestic law deems an act unlawful, extraterritorial ju-
risdiction properly permits recourse against violators. Because
RICO protects vital United States interests, judicial and legisla-
tive solutions must be found to overcome existing barriers to
extraterritorial jurisdiction. This Article has proposed a variety
of judicial and legislative mechanisms for addressing these bar-
riers. If RICO is to continue to evolve, our jurisprudence
should accommodate its extraterritorial application.
203. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821).
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